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This study evolved out of a series of zero-base budgeting seminars
given by the Naval Postgraduate School Administrative Science Depart-
ment at Naval Naval Weapons Center, China Lake during the spring and
summer of 1977.
The seminars resulted from efforts to implement zero-base budget-
ing at Naval Weapons Center under the direction of Rear Admiral R. G.
Freeman. The implementation began at a time when relatively little
information about the subject was generally available and the decision
to install the system and the efforts by everyone at the Center to support
it were made under conditions of great uncertainty and thus were con-
sidered to be forward-looking and innovative actions. Naval Weapons
Center requested that Naval Postgraduate School provide training assist-
ance for key personnel from department staffs and selected line managers,
The loosely structured seminars were designed to highlight the
essential concepts of the zero-base budgeting process. The chief
characteristic of the seminars was their interactive nature. A case
exercise in zero-base budgeting development was designed to give




From the interactive seminar discussion came two significant ob-
servations by the Naval Postgraduate School faculty members involved.
First, there was a great deal of curiosity and interest concerning zero-
base budgeting processes among the trainees. Second, among the train-
ees there was a significant amount of discontent with regard to the
implementation efforts then extant at Naval Weapons Center.
A third observation, made by the author, that Naval Weapons Center
offered an example of zero-base budgeting implementation at a micro-
level organization, combined with the two observations above, provided
a convenient opportunity for comparison of zero-base budgeting theory
and actual implementation experience.
B. SCOPE
The purpose of this study was to compare actual implementation
results with theoretical writings. Since unexpected results might have
been due to factors not covered by theoretical literature, the possibility
of inadequate theory was also considered in the conduct of the study.
However, the likelihood and importance of this event occurring was
regarded as relatively insignificant.
The problems of implementation were used as a basis for the
investigation. Consequently, two core premises formed the foundation
for the study. First, correct implementation of zero-base budgeting,
with respect to theoretical writings, would lead to expected satisfactory
results. Second, incorrect implementation would lead to expected
13

problems. Based on a general inquiry as to the nature of the zero-base
budgeting implementation effort at Naval Weapons Center, a comparison
was made between the actual problems encountered and those predicted
in theory.
In conducting this study of the Naval Weapons Center implementation
experience, an inductive approach was used and general conclusions
were drawn from analysis of specific data.
C. RELATIONSHIP TO PREVIOUS WORK
The first major publication on zero-base budgeting was written by
Peter A. Pyhrr, then of Texas Instruments where the concept was
developed from 1968 to 1971. His article, "Zero-Base Budgeting, "
in the November/December 1970 issue of the Harvard Business Review
stirred considerable interest. The newly elected governor of Georgia,
Jimmy Carter, invited Mr. Pyhrr to join his staff and install the sys-
tem there for the fiscal year 1972-1973. In 1973 Mr. Pyhrr's book,
Zero-Base Budgeting
,
was published. The reader is referred to this
seminal work for further inquiry.
The Georgia zero-base budgeting experience was the subject of a
study conducted by George S. Minmier, a doctorial candidate at the
University of Arkansas. His study, An Evaluation of Zero-Base Budget-
ing as a Tool for Planning and Control of Discretionary Costs in Govern-
mental Institutions, published in 1974, concluded that there were three
14
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primary advantages, one major disadvantage and two significant short-
comings associated with the employment of zero-base budgeting in the
state of Georgia. The first advantage was the establishment of a
financial planning phase prior to the preparation of the fiscal year
budget. Zero-base budgeting showed that some budgetary guidelines
were necessary to properly allocate the state's limited financial
resources. The second advantage was an improvement in the quality
of management information. Zero-base budgeting enabled key govern-
ment officials to have a much greater insight into the functions of the
state government. The third advantage was an increase in involvement
of personnel at the activity level in the state's budgeting process;
activity managers were required to prepare and rank decision packages,
thus providing input into the budgeting process. The major disadvan-
tage was the increased time and effort required for budget preparation.
The two significant shortcomings were: (1) the contention that zero-
base budgeting did not significantly effect the efficient allocation of
the state's financial resources and (2) the apparent ineffectiveness
of the decision package ranking in meeting changes in the level of
funding.
A more recent work, by Logan M. Cheek entitled Zero-Base
Budgeting Comes of Age
,
refines and amplifies the key concepts of
zero-base budgeting and highlights those management techniques
necessary to insure its successful implementation. The reader is
again referred to this work for further information.
15
I
This study, in contrast to the nature of the works mentioned above,
focused on the practical problems of implementing zero-base budgeting
in a micro-level government organization. Some of the implementation
problems identified by Minmier, Cheek and Phyrr were also found in
the Naval Weapons Center endeavor.
16

II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A. BASIS OF THE PROBLEM
The basis of the problem was found in the two observations which
came out of the 1977 Naval Postgraduate School/Naval Weapons Center
Zero-Base Budgeting Seminar discussions. The curiosity of the line
managers with respect to the substance of the zero-base budgeting
process appeared to be motivated by a need to reduce the uncertainties
they faced as a result of the implementation efforts then underway.
Collectively, they seemed to have partial knowledge of the concepts
of zero-base budgeting. They seemed also to be aware of this and
appeared genuinely interested in professional growth.
The line managers' discontent with the implementation efforts
then extant at Naval. Weapons Center seemed to be rooted in their
perceptions of zero-base budgeting as a cumbersome "paper drill"
which top management attempted to use as a basis for making budget
cuts in selected cost categories. In one case, a "zero-base" analysis
of magnetic card typewriters was conducted which resulted in a signif-
icant reduction in the number of those items throughout the installation.
Subsequently, a "zero-base" analysis of computer services was con-
ducted, but did not result in a significant reduction of costs for that
category. As a result of these experiences, many managers viewed
17

zero-base budgeting as an additional paperwork requirement which
threatened their status quo. This view was reflected in attitudes of
apprehension and frustration expressed by various managers during
the first two seminars.
These implementation difficulties, confirmed by management's
request for outside training assistance, constituted the basis of the
problem addressed in this study.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This study attempted to determine if the existing literature on
zero-base budgeting can adequately prepare top management for the
task of implementing zero-base budgeting in a micro-level organization.
Specifically, it tried to determine if the actual problems encountered
in an implementation experience, compared with the problems predicted
in theory, would provide any new information that would enhance the
probability of successfully implementing zero-base budgeting elsewhere.
The problem statement designed to answer these general questions is
composed of two elements. First, does correct implementation of
zero-base budgeting, with respect to the theoretical writings, lead to
expected satisfactory results? Second, will incorrect implementation




This study began with a literature survey coincident to the develop-
ment of a presentation package for the seminars that were to be presented
at Naval Weapons Center, China Lake. From that survey was developed
a summary of zero-base budgeting theory and a questionnaire which was
designed to provide raw data on the beliefs and attitudes of key manage-
ment personnel at Naval Weapons Center. The questionnaires were
circulated and informal interviews were conducted with selected managers.
Once received, the questionnaire responses were analyzed and conclusions
were drawn to complete the study. Each of these stages will be discussed
in some detail below.
19

IV. THEORY OF ZERO-BASE BUDGETING
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Literature
The seminal work on zero-base budgeting was done by Pyhrr.
His book, Zero-Base Budgeting , outlined the philosophy and procedures
of zero-base budgeting and presented modifications necessary to meet
the specific needs of each organization and pinpointed specific problems
and possible solutions.
The previously mentioned work of Minmier on the Georgia
zero-base budgeting experience cited as primary advantages: (1) develop-
ment of a financial planning phase, (2) improvement in the quality of
management information, and (3) an increase in involvement of personnel
at the activity level. The major disadvantage was the increased time
required for budget preparation. Two significant shortcomings noted
were: (1) zero-base budgeting's minimal effect on financial resource
allocation and, (2) ineffectiveness of decision-package ranking on
funding level changes.
The work of Paul J. Stonich, of MAC, Inc. , has, since 1972,
extended across 75 organizations in diverse areas of the private and
public sectors. His book, Zero-Base Planning and Budgeting , began
by defining the zero-base process, comparing it with other budgeting
20

systems, and discussing the concept as it relates to the planning and
control process. He then showed how the process works and how to
determine who should use it and who should avoid it. The problems,
both mechanical and psychological, of implementing the process were
then covered. The book concludes with a chapter identifying specific
functional areas of an organization where zero-base planning and
budgeting applies and suggests design and implementation practices
that are particularly well suited to those areas. One of the most
valuable sections of the book consisted of summaries of cases describ-
ing the implementation and operation of zero-base planning and budget-
ing in six different companies.
The work of Logan M. Cheek of Zerox Corporation, Zero-
Base Budgeting Comes of Age, developed and refined the subtleties
of the zero-base process. Cheek's premise was that successful zero-
base budgeting hinges on more than just a disciplined systematic set
of forms and procedures. Quite a bit more is involved. In his view,
its key success factors include: (1) linking the zero-base process to
the long-range planning process; (2) gaining the support, involvement,
and commitment of top management; (3) generating imagination by cost
center managers; and (4) selling the concept and the ideas it brings
to the surface. Cheek holds that, while these statements initially
appear somewhat platitudinous, translating each of these principles
into practical techniques is critical to success because all are necessary
21

and no one of them alone is sufficient. The translation of these principles
into practical techniques is the substance of Cheek's work.
2. Definition and Theory Structure of Zero- Base Budgeting
Although zero base budgeting uses a number of well-known
management techniques, it is not an all-encompassing planning and
budgeting system. Normally it does not apply to direct labor and direct
material costs. It can be used most effectively wherever administrative,
indirect or discretionary costs are being considered. Pyhrr defines
zero-base budgeting as:
An operating planning and budgeting process which
requires each manager to justify his entire budget
request in detail from scratch (hence zero-base)
and shifts the burden of proof to each manager to
justify why he should spend any money at all. This
approach requires that all activities be identified in
"decision packages" which will be evaluated by sys-
tematic analysis and ranked in order of importance.
Stonich defines zero-base planning and budgeting as:
A comprehensive, analytically structured process
that allows management to make allocation decisions
2
about non-direct costs.
Zero-base budgeting is generally viewed as a decision-making
process. Not all theorists agree on the number of steps in the process.










Zero-Base Planning and Budgeting
, p. 2,
Dow Jones -Irwin, 1977.
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most theorists agree on the basic elements of the process itself. These
basic elements of the zero-base budgeting process can be outlined in
five basic steps: (1) develop planning assumptions; (2) develop decision
packages; (3) rank decision packages; (4) prepare detailed budgets; and
(5) evaluate performance. The analysis conducted in step two is the
heart of the zero-base budgeting process.
B. ZERO-BASE BUDGETING THEORY
1. Develop Planning Assumptions
Decision packages cannot be prepared in a vacuum. Planning
assumptions and guidelines concerning direction and purpose must be
provided by top management to middle and lower level managers before
these subordinates can develop decision packages. These assumptions
serve as input to line managers in their budget preparation efforts and
aid these managers in determining budget year resource requirements.
Formal planning assumptions are needed for several reasons. First,
they force top-level managers to do some detailed planning and goal
setting for the coming budget period early in the budget cycle. Second,
they provide all managers with a uniform basis for viewing the coming
year and estimating resource and output requirements. Third, they
provide a focal point for review/revision of planning assumptions which
in turn requires the revision of decision packages affected by these
assumptions. The number of revisions in assumptions can be control-
led to reduce both confusion and the cycling of budget inputs in rapidly
23

changing environments. Finally, they readily allow managers to identify
the actual expenditure variances during the operating year that are
created by inaccurate assumptions provided during the budgeting process.
Such formalized assumptions might include output volume in units, wage
and salary increases, expected number of clients, plant and equipment
changes, operational changes, probable resource needs, probable
resource availability, and the expected effect of inflation.
The key characteristic of planning assumptions should be that
they connect the long-range of strategic plans and goals to the budgeting
process. Planning assumptions should be realistic and they should
reflect clearly the programs chosen to implement long-range objectives
and strategies.
2. Develop Decision Packages
The development of decision packages is a two-step process.
The first step is to identify and define decision units. The second step
is to analyze decision units and formulate- decision packages. It is
necessary to make a clear distinction between the term "decision unit"
and the term "decision package. " This distinction has been a point of
confusion among theorists and managers alike. A decision unit has
been defined as:
a discrete group of expense-creating activities around
which analysis for discretionary spending decisions is





Pyhrr defines a decision package as:
a document that identifies and describes a specific
activity in such a manner that management can
(1) evaluate it and rank it against other activities
competing for limited resources, and (2) decide
whether to approve or disapprove it.
Decision units are the basic entities for which budgets are
prepared. Decision units must be identified and defined as a necessary
first step in implementing zero-base budgeting. Decision units may be
programs, functions, cost centers, organizational units or, in certain
cases, line items or appropriation items. The simplest approach may
be to define decision units in terms of the present cost centers. But
this need not be the only approach, nor necessarily the best. Since the
zero-base concept is output or results-oriented, this could lead to
defining decision units around products or markets or customer groups
or geographic territories or capital projects or anything else that can
be logically tied to the organization's mission or long-range objectives.
A key criterion is how responsibility for resource allocation decisions
is to be distributed. Decision units need to be established at an
organizational level high enough so that the person responsible for the
operation of the unit (the decision unit manager) has effective control
over the budget dollars.
The key to zero-base budgeting lies in the analysis of decision





It is the most time consuming and the area of most vulnerability. The
analysis begins when the decision unit manager specifies his objective
and the purpose of the decision unit. Following the writing of his
objectives, the decision unit manager describes briefly how he operates
and the resources he uses, both people and dollars. The description
should set out those elements of resources which are unique to the
operation, in addition to the numbers and types of employees that con-
tribute their efforts to the decision unit. Workload and performance
measurements are developed to examine the strengths and weaknesses
of the manager's current approach and to describe his objective in
greater detail. The essence of the decision unit analysis lies in the
identification and evaluation of alternatives for each activity. Two
types of alternatives should be considered when developing decision
packages: (1) different ways of performing the same function (this
analysis identifies alternative ways of performing a function; the best
alternative is chosen and the others are discarded); and (2) different
levels of effort of performing the function (this analysis identifies
alternative levels of effort and spending to perform a specific function).
A minimum level of effort should be established and additional levels
of effort identified as separate decision packages. This minimum level
of effort package may not completely achieve the purpose of the function,
but it should identify and attack the most important elements. In many-
cases, the minimum level of effort will be between 5 0-90% of the current
26

level of operation. The minimum level of effort package would be
ranked higher than the additional level(s) of effort.
In considering both types of alternatives, managers will first
identify different ways of performing the same function and then evaluate
different levels of effort for performing the function for whatever way
or method chosen. The intent of the zero-base process is to provide a
fundamental reexamination of each decision unit before its manager is
permitted to proceed with the formulation of decision packages. In some
instances, however, only perfunctory attention is paid to the questioning
of objectives, activities and operating methods, and decision packages
simply reflect the status quo. The relative emphasis placed on either
of these approaches is a matter to be decided by the implementors and
users of the zero-base budgeting system. Both approaches are useful,
but considerations of time, practicability, and available analytic skills
sometimes dictate that the former be sacrificed and attention concen-
trated on the latter.
In formulating decision packages, the decision unit manager
puts together, in priority order, a series of decision package documents
which together equal the sum total of his budget request for the decision
unit. Each decision package consists of a discrete set of services,
activities, functions, operations or expenditure items identified in a
definitive manner for management evaluation and comparison with other
activities. The highest priority package addresses the most important
27

activities performed by the decision unit, for example, those activities
which produce the highest priority services or which meet the most
critical needs of the decision unit's target population. The cost of this
first package is usually well below the current level of funding for the
decision unit. The first, highest priority package is often thought of
as the minimum level or survival level for the decision unit, the level
of service and funding below which the decision unit might as well be
eliminated.
The decision unit manager's analysis of decision packages is
communicated on a series of forms, using a separate form for each
decision package. Each form documents: (1) precisely what services
are to be provided or activities performed, if this package is funded;
(2) the resource requirements of the package and their cost; and (3) a
quantitative expression of workload, output or results anticipated if the
package is funded. Usually, each form displays, in addition to the cost
of the package, the cumulative cost of this plus all preceding (higher
priority) packages in the series for the decision unit. Often the cumula-
tive cost is also expressed as a percentage of the prior year's total
for the decision unit. Similarly, the quantitative program measures
are also usually accumulated and expressed as a percentage of the
prior year's figure. In some cases the decision unit manager is asked
to identify additional information on each decision package form, such
as benefits of funding a package, consequences of not funding a package,
28

present services which would not be provided if only a given package
and those which precede it are funded, support required from other
decision units if a given package is funded, and the like.
At the same time the decision unit manager is analyzing his
current and ongoing activities, he should identify all new activities and
programs and develop decision packages that handle them, analyzing
alternatives for different ways and different levels of effort to implement
these new programs. At the conclusion of the formulation stage, the
decision unit manager will have identified all his proposed activities
for the coming year in decision packages that fall into one of three
categories: (1) different ways and/ or different levels of effort for
performing the activity; (2) "Business as usual, " where there are no
logical alternatives, or the present method and level of effort is re-
quired; and (3) new activities and programs. The decision packages
are now ready to be ranked.
3. Rank Decision Packages
Ranking is the process in which a manager reviews all decision
packages (from all organization units reporting to the manager) and
establishes their relative priority. The ranking process provides
management with a technique for allocating its limited resources by
concentrating on the questions of how much money to spend and on what
to spend it.
Management answers these questions by listing all packages
identified in order of decreasing benefit or importance. A running
29

cumulative total is kept to indicate the total budget request for the sum of
each package plus all preceding (higher priority) packages. Managers
can then identify the benefits to be gained at each level of expenditure
and can study the consequences of not approving additional packages
ranked below that expenditure level. The initial ranking should occur
at the organization level where the packages are developed, so each
manager can evaluate the importance of his own activities and rank his
packages accordingly. The manager at the next level up the organization
structure reviews these rankings and uses them as guides to produce
a single, consolidated ranking for all the packages presented to him
from below. Consolidation can continue until one final ranking is
achieved at some desired organization level. This consolidation hierarchy
usually coincides with the hierarchy of the organization, but logical
groupings of similar functions may be useful even where they cut across
normal organizational boundaries.
In the ranking process, attention is usually concentrated on
those packages which lie within a reasonable range around the probable
cutoff line, i.e.
,
the expected funding level for the collection of decision
units whose packages are being ranked. For example, if 40 packages
are being ranked, it is usually not necessary to determine precisely
the relative priorities among packages number one, two and three nor
packages number 38, 39 and 40. It is more important to insure that
those packages which fall just above and just below the probable budget
30

cutoff line are indeed in the order which properly reflects management's
priorities.
Ranking may be performed in a variety of ways. Four common
ranking approaches which enjoy widespread use are: (1) the single-
standard approach; (2) the voting system; (3) the major category system;
and (4) the multiple- standard approach.
In the single- standard approach, the simplest approach and the
one most appropriate for families of similar programs (like capital
budget requests), all packages are evaluated by one, but only one,
criterion. This may be return on investment, absolute dollar savings,
net present value, discounted cash flow, or benefit/cost ratios. Thus,
given a list of two dozen capital investment packages, each internally
sound and consistent, ranking is a five step process: (1) gain agree-
ment on the standard to be used; (2) rank all programs using that
standard; (3) determine the cutoff point in view of available resources;
(4) approve and fund all packages above the cutoff level and defer or
eliminate others; and (5) communicate the decision to the proper
managers. The single- standard approach is simple and involves no
great effort. It should not be used by managers in organizations with
complicated budgeting situations.
The voting system, the earliest and most widely used, is
particularly appropriate for organizations that are ranking by com-
mittee and have to array quickly a large number of packages, usually
over 50. This system is also useful for an individual manager or two-
member team that has to cope with a large volume of packages. The
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voting system works as follows. At the first review level each member
of the committee is provided a complete set of decision packages and
ranking sheets. For large volumes of packages, each is copied on
acetate slides for overhead projection. The committee meets, dis-
cusses each package to gain a thorough understanding of it, then votes on
a fixed scale with either the average or the total points determining the
ranking. The preliminary consensus on ranking is copied on a ranking
sheet and projected on the overhead. The discussion then hinges on
resolving differences to make sure there are no major misunderstandings
Some packages may be repositioned at this point. On resolving those
differences, a final ranking is reached, converted into hard copy format,
and passed to the next higher level for consideration and final decision.
Ranking by voting is not an objective procedure, being subject to the
inherent biases of the committee members. If it is to be of any use, it
must be reviewed carefully at higher levels to correct those biases.
Alternatively, the standards for voting must be explicitly spelled out,
tightly administered, and understood by everybody if the end product
is to be of any value.
Explicitly predefining major categories into which decision
packages will be slotted and ranked is a variation of the voting system
designed to overcome one of the most common games managers are
known to play during voting sessions. Many managers involved in
ranking tacitly (or sometimes explicitly) agree to give high ratings to
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marginal packages and low ratings to those of obvious worth. Unless
this behavior is detected during higher review, the budget will grow out
of hand. The behavior can be effectively counteracted by forcing those
responsible for ranking to place each of their decision packages into
major categories. In so doing, the assumption is made that some
packages are "more equal" than others. Some categories that might be
predefined are (1) all efforts required by law; (2) all efforts, however
small, that pay for themselves in the first year; (3) all "requirements"
for a core management cadre; (4) all efforts of substantial long-term
economic merit; (5) all efforts of average, but positive, long-term
economic merit; and (6) all other efforts.
The third category, "all requirements" for a core management
cadre, is designed for those department or section heads who often
will entertain no discussion, compromise, or budgetary scrutiny of
certain "sacred cows" within their territory. Even though decision
packages in this category may well be of lesser economic merit, by
assuring the core cadre that a limited number of decision packages
are secure and protected, it may be possible for top management to
gain agreement to far more drastic and needed changes in other areas.
That may be a small price to pay for substantial savings. What is
critical about this category is that it must be judiciously employed.
The recalcitrant manager should be given only enough latitude for




The multiple- standards approach is based on the premise that
success in implementing any decision package will depend on five issues,
not all of which are economic. These are: (1) Is the program legally-
required? (2) Are the necessary technical skills available? (3) Will
line management accept and execute the program? (4) Will the program
be cost-effective? and (5) What are the economic risks of not implement-
ing this package?
Packages that are legally required should be just that and no
more. One game often played by some staff managers is to piggyback
nonstatutory efforts into these decision packages. Careful scrutiny of
each legally required decision package during the review process can
prevent this. By identifying and segregating efforts clearly required
by law, it is possible to focus on the heart of the process and its most
challenging aspects: the feasibility evaluation.
Resolving the issue of technical skills requires consideration
of the decision package's "state of the art" implications; for example,
what are the technical problems involved? Do the skills required to
overcome these problems exist inside or outside the organization? The
key point in this regard is that the technical feasibility for all programs
must be consistently evaluated against the same yardsticks.
The issue of line management acceptance or execution of a
program requires a frank assessment of behavioral problems. What
are the attitudes, policies, and management styles which characterize
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the line organization? What is its structure and how does it operate?
Since these elements are the most difficult to change, this issue is
probably the most critical of the five. Given an unwillingness to change
(or, conversely, a need for aggressive promotional efforts on the part
of the staff to effect the necessary changes), the sponsoring budget
center should waste little time musing about the value of such efforts,
regardless of the imaginativeness of the decision package or its economic
worth.
Resolving the issue of program cost-effectiveness requires
consideration of the proposal's net economic benefits, using benefit-
cost analysis with appropriate modifications. For all programs, the
specific issue to be resolved is: What probable dollar impact can
reasonably be expected from implementing the program? To answer
this question, the sponsoring budget center identifies potential benefits
and costs, estimates the probability of each benefit and cost, and cal-
culates the probable dollar impact. For some programs, estimating
potential benefits is often difficult. Overcoming this problem requires
that benefits be estimated by either of two approaches: identifiable
benefits or target benefits.
Identifiable benefits are used whenever possible. They must
be tangible and clearly attributable to implementing the proposal.
Target benefits are used in the absence of hard experience. In essence,
these are preliminary estimates of results that the responsible staff
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manager promises to deliver if given the resources to pilot-test his
proposal. The goal of such pilot-testing procedures is to allocate
resources toward those projects most likely to yield the greatest relative
benefits and commit managers to results.
Resolving the issue of economic risks incurred by not implement-
ing a given package is done by top management asking itself the question,
"Can we afford not to act? " Failure to implement a specific program
could result in unacceptable cost exposures. Failure to reevaluate
continually pre-employment selection standards may result in the hiring
of less qualified employees with subsequent declines in productivity.
Once every program has been evaluated on its own merits, the
feasibility of each must now be determined. A decision table can be
used to accomplish this. The table should be structured so that a high
rating in any one factor would not conclusively decide in favor of any
given program, but a low rating in any one of them would very possibly
eliminate the program from consideration. The end result is that each
program can be categorized into one of five categories: legally required,
very desirable, moderately desirable, marginally desirable, or not
worthwhile. These categories are used to classify each major program
in the program ranking schedule. The legally required programs appear
at the top of the schedule, and all other programs are ranked within
the appropriate overall feasibility category by their economic benefits.
This program ranking schedule is the basic tool for allocating
resources. Using it implies that management must undertake some
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tough-minded actions, specifically: trimming marginal programs,
allocating resources toward the most worthwhile projects, evaluating
all new program proposals and reordering proposals as necessary, and
reevaluating the entire effort as appropriate.
The acid test of an approved decision package's value is its
execution. Progress in executing each package must be carefully
monitored to identify bottlenecks as they develop, to chart alternatives
where necessary, and ensure timely implementation and the achievement
of planned benefits, particularly among high-payback packages. It is in
this area that the budget staff or controller will be the prime mover.
4. Prepare Detailed Budgets
When the allocation decisions have been made, detailed budgets
are prepared. The ranking schedule drawn up by management and the
individual decision package forms which show all increments provide
the basis for this mechanical function. This budget, although prepared
in vastly different fashion than traditional budgets, is similar in format
to the end product of the traditional approach. The cost data feed directly
into the organization's existing budgeting and control system.
5. Evaluate Performance
Zero-base budgeting provides financial data as well as workload
and performance measurements for management review. Decision unit
managers can be held responsible for costs and performance. To be
effective, zero-base budgeting needs to be reinforced through measure-
ment and control. Three useful methods of evaluation are: (1) Monthly
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financial review of each decision package and ranking unit: This is a
traditional financial review based on budget compared to actual. It is
based solely on costs expended. (2) Quarterly output review of each
decision package and ranking unit: This review of the planned output
of the organization is the key to the successful use of the system. The
performance measurements are used to make this evaluation. (3) Quar^
terly (or as needed) plan and budget revisions for the organization and
decision units: A process whereby orderly revisions to plans can be
made is essential. This is based on performance to date and environ-
mental factors facing the organization such as profit pressures.
Like any planning and budgeting technique, the zero-base
budgeting system can easily become entangled in analytical gymnastics,
both in formulating decision packages and in ranking them. This will
defeat zero-base budgeting's prime objective of more rational resource
allocation and quick decision making. To prevent this, both forms and
ranking procedures should be kept as simple as possible.
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V. THEORETICAL IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
Implementing a zero-base budgeting system in an organization can
present a wide range of problems for management attention. Most of
these difficulties can be resolved by effective management decisions
and actions. The common perplexities attendant to implementation of
zero-base budgeting can be categorized many different ways. The
following analysis investigates seven common problem areas peculiar
to the implementation of a zero-base budgeting system. While these
areas are treated separately here, it should be noted that they are
frequently interrelated in actual practice. The analysis will explore
the major perplexities and problems of top management, of planning
assumptions, of time, of individual behaviors, of administrative matters
related to implementation, of decision package formulation, and of the
ranking process.
B. PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION
1. Top Management Problems
The single factor most critical to the success or failure of
zero-base budgeting is the support of top management. In this regard,
top management includes the organization's chief executive, key lieuten-




force who will administer the process. The support required is a
firm determination, a commitment, to implement and manage change
for the better. The failure of top management to take a personal stand
on critical and controversial issues can undermine even the best efforts
of decision-unit managers. Within an organization, doubt about top
management's commitment to the zero-base budgeting system can
effectively prevent its successful implementation because managers
experience all the fears and problems before the benefits are realized.
The decisions resulting from the critical issues mentioned above are
ones with which top management will have to live, implement and defend.
These are not issues or decisions that can be delegated to a support
staff. They require considerable, though rewarding, time on the part of
key executives. Failure to get involved and take the time required to
make these critical decisions can cause the whole effort to stumble.
Frequently, the missing link to success is the will to manage at the
top. Sometimes the process stumbles because of lack of backbone.
Often, priorities that conflict with zero-base budgeting are a factor.
For example, an executive nearing retirement may find efforts required
by zero-base budgeting too demanding in view of his other pursuits.
Failure of top management to provide forceful leadership is
often the cause of an unsuccessful implementation effort. Unless top
executives are willing to provide leadership by insisting on nothing
5 Cheek, p. 159.
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less than the best efforts of decision-unit managers, unless they are
prepared to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty and unless
they are willing to assign the best talents in the organization to launch
and administer the process, then the benefits of zero-base budgeting
have little chance of being realized.
Failure of top management to elicit and solicit ideas from all
sources, subordinates and outsiders alike, will prevent the full potential
of zero-base budgeting from being attained. Unless the sources of input
are maximized, it is unlikely that all the relevant information necessary
to decide which packages are best pursued will be brought to light.
Often, problems are created during the implementation process
when top management develops unrealistic expectations for the zero-
base process. The most frequent example of this is the tendency to
emphasize the cost-cutting feature of zero-base budgeting. Other top
managers, frequently those of organizations with serious financial
problems, perceive zero-base budgeting as a panacea for a host of
problems. Failure to appreciate the staff work required to implement
properly zero-base budgeting can cause top management to become
impatient and disillusioned with the advertised benefits of the process.
Simply having expectations which are too high or expecting results too
soon can cause top management to demand too much of the process or
move too fast in its implementation.
Finally, failure of top management to provide sufficient,
timely feedback to managers is an influential source of doubt about
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the commitment of key executives to the zero-base implementation
plan.
2. Planning Assumption Problems
Managers responsible for implementing the zero-base budgeting
process in an organization need to specify clearly and concisely the
economic and planning assumptions which will under ly the budget
proposals. If this is not done, a number of problems will arise:
(1) managers will make their own, differing, assumptions; (2) coopera-
tion and coordination among related or service activities will usually
be inadequate without a formal method of communicating and revising
assumptions; (3) many managers, especially those fearing a loss of
power, stature or responsibility attendant to major changes or those
with limited vision, will not consider radically different alternatives
to their current way of operating; and (4) a lot of time will be wasted
unnecessarily in revising decision packages in accordance with the
intended plans of top management.
3. Time Problems
When a zero-base budgeting system is being implemented,
first-year time requirements for planning and budgeting may exceed
those of the previous year for a number of reasons. First, more
managers normally become involved in this process than were involved
in the previous planning and budgeting process. Consequently, the
training, communication, and administrative workload and time are
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greatly increased initially. Second, there is a steep learning curve
during the first year of implementation which flattens out during sub-
sequent years. Third, in addition to budgeting, other management
tasks are included in zero-base budgeting which may not have been
included in the previous budget system. Goal setting, operational
decision making, and control are integral parts of zero-base budgeting
which require management time and attention but are often done outside
of the normal budget cycle. Fourth, in a zero-base budgeting system
managers spend a considerable amount of time analyzing, evaluating and
setting priorities on current activities as well as new activities where
previously they had focused primarily on new activities. Finally,
formulating, sorting, and ranking decision packages and relating them
to strategic goals are all integral components of zero-base budgeting
which require numerous management decisions and consequently a
significant amount of time.
4. Behavioral Problems
The behavioral problems associated with the implementation
of a zero-base budgeting system can generally be categorized three
ways; fears, beliefs and gamesmanship.
Managers are often fearful of any new process because of the
uncertainty it represents. The zero-base budgeting emphasis on difficult
decision making and priority ranking under full scrutiny of superiors




those who prize survival and who have learned to survive by being
cautious and conservative. The threats of responsibility loss, power
loss, layoffs, cutbacks, and transfer are common fears of managers
during their initial encounter with zero-base budgeting. The mere
mention of the word "zero" frightens some people. However, the most
significant problem intrinsic to the zero-base process is that it demands
that management view the organization in a completely different way.
In a zero-base review, no budget item can be taken for granted. The
organization is viewed as though it were starting anew. Consequently,
more planning is required. Planning is hard work.
Many managers, particularly those in bureaucratic organizations,
hold categorical beliefs about any "new" budgeting system. Frequently,
zero-base budgeting is viewed as the same old system with modifica-
tions and a different name. The belief that top management is not
committed to the system may prevent many managers from giving it
their best efforts. Often, the belief is held that a defense is required
to survive yet another top management scheme, an exercise, to improve
things. Consequently, complacency and disinterest prevail throughout
the operating organization. Also, many managers believe that their
particular organization is different from others and that for reasons
peculiar to their organization, zero-base budgeting cannot work for
them. Finally, due to misunderstandings of the purpose and the mechanics
of zero-base budgeting, many managers behave in non-rational ways
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toward its implementation. These behaviors range from complacency
and defensiveness to outright hostility and include subtle sabotage and
gamesmanship.
The dominant gamesmanship tactic used is that of including
low priority programs in the minimum level of effort package and
including key, high priority, activities in later increments. The effect
of this, if not detected through careful review, is an arbitrarily inflated
final budget.
5. Administrative Problems
The classification of implementation problems as "administra-
tive" is a tenuous and somewhat arbitrary assignment. Although the
three problem areas discussed below can be reasonably included in other
problem categories, they appear to be more of an administrative nature
than anything else. The three problem areas are: (1) volume of paper-
work; (Z) process design; and (3) achievement of benefits of program
packages when the control system is based on functional accounts.
The dominant administrative problem associated with the
zero-base budgeting process is the large volume of paperwork it
generates. The number of decision packages created in an organiza-
tion by effectively identifying each discrete activity, and several levels
of effort for each, presents a formidable task for all levels of manage-
ment. This information saturation problem is magnified when a sub-
stantial number of decision packages, prepared and ranked at lower
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organizational levels, are subsequently divided into two or more
packages, consolidated into larger packages, or deleted from the sys-
tem as they progress up the organizational structure. Since manage-
ment has the conflicting need to make funding trade-offs among all
activities in the organization that are competing for the same resources,
it must decide when the benefits derived from such information are no
longer equal to the cost of obtaining it.
Unless a careful job of designing the decision package analysis
and ranking forms is done, unnecessary or irrelevant data will be
gathered and included in the decision packages. Consequently, the
importance of determining what information will be needed as final
output, and including only that on the forms, cannot be overemphasized.
In developing a process design that fits the organization culture,
problems fall into two categories; structure and function. The process
structure should be tailored to the organization's specific needs, rather
than thoughtlessly adopted from some other organization. Some problems
which the process structure should be designed to eliminate are: con-
fusion among managers as to who is responsible for what during the
implementation process (resolved by the creation of a designated task
force), misdirection of planning and budgeting efforts (resolved by
developing a work plan and timetable), and misinformation about zero-




It is probably, not possible to administer the process without
setting up a task force that spends considerable time on the project.
Task force members should possess good interviewing and analytic
skills and should be perceived as being objective so as to encourage
openness and candor in decision unit managers.
A work plan and timetable are essential so that all managers
have a thorough understanding of what work is to be accomplished and
when milestones are to be met.
Decision unit managers should be told through a training
presentation that a zero-base system gives them a channel of com-
munication with upper levels of management; that they have a forum
for discussing problems, opportunities, and alternatives. They should
also be given basic information on how the process works, general
information on benefits of the system, and detailed information on their
responsibilities. A manual detailing how the process works should be
provided to each decision unit manager for further individual study.
Some problems which proper functioning of the process should
eliminate are: doubts and conflicts among decision unit managers
(resolved by assistance from task force members), lack of motivation
in managers (resolved by persuasive communication of strategic goals
and objectives throughout the organization by top management), and the
need for validation of the efforts of decision unit managers (resolved by
monitoring their output and providing feedback in the form of informa-
tion, rewards, and sanctions).
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The task force should report to the top executive and should
consist of people familiar with zero-base budgeting and of people well
versed in the organization's financial procedures. Ideally, task force
members should provide individual assistance to decision unit managers,
spending about one person/day of effort, in one to two hour time periods,
per each manager.
Pitting managers, task forces or committees against one
another does not foster innovation nor does it motivate managers to be
open and straightforward about their activities (except when implement-
ing approved programs). What is required initially is a climate of
mutual support and openness in which strategic goals and objectives are
persuasively communicated. An environment is developed in which each
views the others as resources and not competitive threats and in which
there is general feedback on performance so that all can contribute
better.
While some systematic analysis of non-direct cost activities
are specifically designed to be a one-time procedure, zero-base budget-
ing is a continuous management process. Without appropriate follow-up
activity, however, the process will soon become ineffective. Therefore,
to ensure the long-range success of zero-base budgeting in any organiza-
tion, the process needs to be monitored and the efforts of managers
need to be validated through top level evaluation and feedback in the form
of rewards and penalties.
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The problem of effectiveness and efficiency measurement of
program benefits when the organization control system is organized in
terms of functional accounts is solved by integrating zero-base budget-
ing with the current accounting system. Since a major restructuring
of the accounting system is expensive and has significant consequences
throughout the organization, integration of zero-base budgeting with the
account structure is best viewed from two points of view: short-term
and long-term. For the short term the budget can be summed up from
the approved decision packages and for overall control purposes can be
fed into the current accounting system using the accounting data con-
tained in each decision package. To ensure proper control of packages
of particular merit, they should be noted and placed in a suspense file
for follow-up. For longer term purposes, restructuring the chart of
accounts along program or decision package lines will improve the
overall management control system. Prudence suggests investing in a
major restructuring of the account system only after one or more
successful years with the new process.
6. Decision Package Formulation Problems
Most of the problems of formulating decision packages are
usually associated with one of the five following activities: (1) deter-
mining where decision packages are to be prepared; (2) defining work-
load measurements; (3) defining decision units; (4) defining the mini-
mum level of effort; and (5) determining the decision package format.
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A decision package can be created "where discrete pieces of
an operation can have meaningful identification and evaluation. " The
consideration then becomes, "Meaningful to whom? " and "Meaningful
at what organizational level? " Decision packages must be meaningful
both for those preparing the packages and those reviewing them. If
the packages initially prepared are summaries of several discrete
pieces of an operation prepared by middle management, top level
management may still be able to allocate resources satisfactorily. But,
unless a detailed analysis of each discrete activity is performed, top
management will never know the cost effectiveness of its operations
and the benefits resulting from the participation of lower level managers,
who perform the function and spend the money, will be lost. Where
possible, a better approach is to identify the discrete activities upon
which analyses are to be based, develop decision packages using these
activities or units, and then make any summaries required when the
volume of packages at any given level of review becomes too great for
detailed evaluation of each package. Integral to and implicit in the
choice of discrete activities are the questions of which managers will
be involved in the preparation of decision packages and at which organiza-
tion levels will the decision packages be ranked.
Pyhrr cites four basic considerations in determining a mean-




(1) size of operation; (2) available alternatives; (3) organization level
7
at which meaningful decisions can be made; and (4) time constraints.
The size of each organization and its operations is the most
influential factor on how and where decision packages are developed.
Decision packages from larger organizations tend to approach discrete
activities more than do those of smaller organizations, even if the
smaller organization has the same set of discrete activities, because
of the realistic alternatives available.
The realistic alternatives available to each manager also
influence the development of decision packages. Commitments or
legal contracts may inhibit or delay a recommendation that would
normally be acceptable. Contracts for rental space may prohibit
moves, labor contracts may inhibit management's freedom of action,
and industry standard practice may eliminate some alternatives. In
government, agencies are often restricted by other agencies or levels
of government.
Normally, an organizational chart is the best indication of
the level at which decision packages should be prepared. If a detailed
cost center exists, it is a logical place to start because it was estab-
lished initially for the identification and control of discrete activities.
Any undertaking is limited in what can be realistically accom-





which decision packages are prepared are variable within each organiza-
tion, and are influenced primarily by the size of the organization, the
quality of managers preparing decision packages, and the time allotted
to the zero-base budgeting process. Management can also expect the
first year's implementation to take longer, and have less successful
results, than might be experienced in subsequent years.
Stonich points out three types of problems associated with
workload and performance measurement when zero-base budgeting is
implemented: (1) no such measurements have ever been established;
(2) very little quantitative data is readily available; and (3) the function
8
that such measurements serve is often not understood.
The key to establishing appropriate workload and performance
measurements is to get managers to review decision units in a detailed
analytical fashion. This analysis will give the decision unit manager a
better understanding of what his operation is doing and what it is capable
of doing, thus enabling top management to evaluate more effectively
potential budget revisions.
During the first year of zero-base implementation it is essential
for managers to identify their key workload and performance measure-
ments. If the data that is required for these measurements is not avail-
able, the measurements should be listed anyway with the data spaces





The importance of determining key workload and performance
measurements needs to be stressed to all managers. These measure-
ments provide top management with an effective way of evaluating the
decision unit managers' effort. Also, since determination of these
measurements requires decision unit managers to specify the major
tasks they want performed and their major objectives, this information
serves as a useful communication mechanism with top management.
Appropriate workload and performance measurements allow
fair cost/benefit analyses to be made not only within a particular
decision package but across increments of different decision packages.
Identifying costs of a given package or increment is often simply a
matter of summing expense accounts into the appropriate decision
packages. Cheek points out that measuring benefits is an entirely
different matter that merits special attention and any one of three
approaches can be pursued: (1) the single-criterion approach; (2) the
9
multiple-criterion approach; and (3) the opportunity cost approach.
The single-criterion approach is most common where the zero-
base concept is used for capital budgeting. All projects are described
in decision packages. Each is evaluated in terms of either return on
investment or cash flow or years to break even or some other quanti-




The multiple-criterion approach is normally used where the
zero-base concept is applied to staff budgets. Again, all projects are
described in decision packages. Each is evaluated on any one of two or
three yardsticks. Those most frequently used are increased revenue,
increased productivity or decreased cost of line organizations. After
translating these projected benefits into dollar values, costs can be
subtracted and the packages ranked in descending order of net benefit.
The opportunity cost approach can be used either in staff or
capital budgeting situations. Unlike the multiple criteria approach,
it is particularly useful where benefits cannot be easily related to
revenues or, in some organizations, decreased costs. The estimated
cost of the proposed approach is subtracted from the actual cost of the
present approach to yield a net savings. The various packages of net
savings are ranked in descending order.
In defining decision units, one rule overrides everything; do
not lose sight of the preagreed objective for the zero-base effort.
That objective, to put together the annual budget, achieve a one- shot
cost reduction, or audit the effectiveness of staff programs, should
drive management's thought process as decision units are defined.
Cheek suggests five guidelines: (1) each package should stand alone;
(2) top management should set a minimum organization level from which
decision packages are to be developed; (3) each manager should be
permitted to break down further his decision unit into smaller packages;
54

(4) focus on staff rather than on line operations; and (5) stay flexible.
Requiring each package to stand alone permits the clear identi-
fication of all true costs of a given service. This precludes confusion
during ranking if one package that supports another happens to get
eliminated.
Normally, the minimum organization level for developing
decision packages is a section operation of no less than five to seven
people, although the minimum level could range from one to 100 people.
In breaking down decision units into smaller packages, the
minimum size should be that level of effort required to complete a job
meaningfully and provide some benefit to the organization. However,
since the prime objective of zero-base budgeting is decision making,
it should be noted that fractionalized packages defeat that purpose and
create a blizzard of paperwork.
Focusing on staff vice line operations takes advantage of the
crucial value of zero-base budgeting: its effect on the leverage of staff
managers with respect to line operations. A one dollar investment into
focused effort on the part of staff management, for example, a personnel
job enrichment specialist, will likely yield a hundred fold return in line
productivity.
Maintaining flexibility encourages innovation within a manager's





There are several reasons why managers have difficulty in
defining a minimum level of effort for their activities. First, the
concept of a minimum level of effort is difficult to think about since it
appears to be a demand for the same performance with less resources.
Actually, what is being asked for is a different job than that currently
being performed. The manager must focus on structural changes to
the job in addition to contractions of effort to achieve the minimum.
Many managers start with the notion that they are already performing
at the minimum. It takes a certain amount of discussion with the zero-
base task force members for most decision unit managers to understand
thoroughly this concept. Second, the unwillingness of some decision
unit managers to admit that there is a lower level of effort in their
general responsibility area that would suffice in a demanding situation
makes the identification of minimum increments difficult. They cor-
rectly sense that identifying a lower level of effort may open them up
to a potential reduction of budget. This concern can be overcome
when the manager understands the overall system and believes he has
a fair chance to argue for and win his case during the ranking process.
A third problem is frequently experienced by managers is the need to
prioritize their activities within the decision unit's scope. They see
the approach to different levels of effort as sequential in nature,
requiring that one single activity be fully funded prior to the inclusion
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of the next. The concept of variable service levels of effort within each
activity that is needed to accomplish the purpose of the decision unit
must be understood first. The decision unit manager can then organize
his increments to include all necessary activities, albeit at variable
levels of effort. This approach acknowledges the "partial, but suf-
ficient" concept that is fundamental to zero-base budgeting.
To a large extent, the success of the zero-base process
hinges on the development of minimum levels of efforts. If every
minimum increment involved 100 percent of the previous year's budget,
there would be no way to arrange these increments in the ranking process
so that the overall budget could be reduced.
Achievement of reallocation of resources requires that true
minimum increments be designated. To the extent that there are a
number of increments in each decision unit between the minimum level
and the current level of spending, reallocation of resources by ranking
the increments is made possible.
Top management can make use of target percentages to help
managers define the minimum level of effort. Any number from 50 to
90 percent of the previous year's budget can be chosen to serve as a
target goal for each manager. The emphasis should be on finding the
true minimum level of effort, below which no meaningful work can be
accomplished. In cases where managers arrive at minimum increments
which exceed their target, a special effort should be made to assist
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them in analyzing their decision unit requirements. Used this way,
the target percentage serves as an exception system so special analytical
effort can be applied to those areas needing it the most.
The development of true minimum levels of effort depends,
in addition to the analytical skill of the decision unit manager, on the
degree to which the task force members ask penetrating questions, and
in that way encourage managers to take a hard look at their operations.
Decision package formats will vary widely among and even
within organizations, depending primarily on what management is
trying to accomplish. There is no such thing as a mandatory "model"
decision package. The purpose of the decision package form is to
communicate the analysis and recommendations made by each manager
for his activities and operations to higher levels of management for
review and ranking. If managers adequately identify their discrete
activities and various levels of effort, large numbers of packages are
apt to be prepared, even in small organizations. Therefore, the
package format must find some trade-off between length of document
and desirable information displayed. In determining the format of
decision packages the following ideas should be considered: (1) The
information required for top management to make a funding decision
must, at a minimum, include basic benefit/cost analysis, as well as
any additional information specified by top management; (2) The format
of the decision package can be used to specify the type of analysis
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desired by top management; (3) Special and backup analysis should be
attached to the basic package or made available upon request in order
to limit the volume of packages; (4) Additional detailed cost information
can be processed after the basic funding decisions have been made in
order to save a great deal of time; and (5) The type of communication
and size of the organization determine the size of the document. If
decision packages are presented verbally, as can be done in smaller
organizations, the package document itself can be reasonably short,
giving a brief summary of the analysis. In larger organizations relying
more on written communications, top management may tend to rely on
summary analyses, and then possibly review the discretionary decision
packages around which the final funding level will be determined.
Regardless of its purpose, each decision package should in-
clude the following elements: (1) basic identifying data, including the
program name, number and level of effort, a brief description of the
program's goals and objectives, as well as the sponsoring organization,
cost center, author and date; (2) feasibility assessment, including
details on the program's economic benefits, costs, and the risks of not
acting (in addition, many organizations require an assessment of the
program's legal necessity and technical and operational feasibility);
(3) alternative courses of action, including the different ways considered,
but not recommended, of performing the same function.
Where a decision package is being used to develop an operating
budget, the package format might also include: (1) intangibles that
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cannot be quantified such as improved morale or public image •-- these
aspects often warrant significant consideration when a difficult choice
must be made between two packages of equal economic merit; (2) ac-
count level detail to facilitate translating approved packages into the
existing accounting and control system; (3) a head count of exempt and
non-exempt personnel associated with a given program; (4) cross-
references to supporting packages though it is preferable that all
packages stand alone; (5) product line allocation where management
wishes to allocate staff expenses to profit centers or product lines;
(6) operating ratios such as benefit/cost ratios or unit volume of
sales per market analyst for analytic evaluation and comparison with
other packages; and (7) the assumptions used in developing the package
to ensure economic feasibility, though these are better left to an
attachment.
In addition, if zero-base budgeting is used to validate a long-
range plan, some forms include a cross-reference to the organization's
goals. Also, functional coding by type of service activity can be in-
cluded on the form to enable a computer search for redundant activities.
This is particularly useful in large governmental organizations.
The inclusion of all conceivable information on the form
costs time and money, and can clog the zero-base budgeting process
with so much paperwork that it quickly ceases to be a useful decision
making tool. The trade-off decision is between the cost and benefits
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of obtaining additional information. A two-page format is probably-
best, as it can show enough detail to enable management to make most
decisions. A three-page form is about the longest desired because of
the volume problems created by additional paper. A minimum length of
one page can be used in smaller organizations as a sound basis for
discussion and ranking. More than one package should not be put on
a single form to enable the forms to be shuffled into their order of
priority for review purposes. The content and layout of decision
packages is completely variable, and should be modified to fit the
needs of the user organization
7. Ranking Process Problems
The ranking process is the listing of decision packages in
order of decreasing benefit to the organization so that top management
can determine what amount of funding the organization can afford and
what packages the organization can afford to do without. While there
are not a great number of problems identified with the ranking process,
they are somewhat difficult to analyze because of their interrelated
nature and their complexity. Two questions emerge, one fairly specific
and straightforward; the other less specific and more complex. These
are first, who should rank, and second, how does management satisfy
the real purposes of the ranking process?
The responsibility for ranking can be given to cost center or
decision unit managers, to a two-person team within a department,
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to a special task force for inter- or intradepartmental work, or to the
organization's budget staff.
The initial ranking should be performed by the cost center or
decision unit manager who developed the packages. This allows the
manager to determine and communicate views on the relative importance
of various efforts with full knowledge that the ranking is subject to re-
ordering during the review process at higher levels.
The value of using individual cost center managers can be en-
hanced by including a second manager. In large organizations, this
can be the departmental planning and budgeting manager while in smaller
ones it can be a financially knowledgeable staff member tasked for such
an assignment during the budget cycle. The value of this approach is
the complementary aspect of the team. The cost center manager has
the most knowledge of decision package objectives, their technical
aspects, the subtle details of the department's activities, and the
scheduling and timing problems which might arise. Alternatively, the
planning and budget manager, through related expertise, should com-
mand a great deal of information on the organization's objectives and
strategies; on output, pricing, expense and workforce projections;
and on more routine things such as salaries, productivity, absenteeism
and labor turnover rates. This is simply a case of two heads being
better than one. Both together are more likely to identify better solu-




As the ranking and consolidating process moves upward through
larger organizations, the need for expertise may require a larger task
force. As the number of packages under consideration increases, it
quickly exceeds the ability of a single manager to deal with them.
Consequently, a task force can be staffed which might include the key
managers from the participating subunits of the organization. The
flow of consolidation can be along either organization or functional lines.
Assigning the responsibility for ranking to the budget staff or
a committee selected out of the controller's department is the least .
desirable solution for two reasons. First, since the ranking process is
primarily an operational planning and decision making technique, and
since it is the operating staff managers who will have to execute the
approved rankings and implement the decision packages, assigning
ranking responsibility to the budget staff diffuses accountability for the
entire effort. This option includes the risk of later accusations by
staff managers that the budget was not their own. Second, few control-
lers or their staffs have the depth of expertise to appreciate fully the
subtleties of every package. Under critical circumstances this approach
may be imperative however. In such a case, an independent review
committee could better play the role of "organization conscience" in
examining the packages and their rankings.
The question of how management satisfies the real purposes
of the ranking process (provide a forum for communication and make
resource allocation choices) is more difficult to answer.
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During the ranking process, the basic communication needs of
top management are: (1) to identify the order of priority placed on each
decision package; (2) to skim the rankings to get an intuitive grasp of
the types of activities as well as the dollars and people involved, and
to selectively pick the packages they want to review; (3) to identify the
trend between the current year's effort and the minimum level of effort
identified for the budget year in order to flag for review those minimum
level effort packages showing increased effort or no reduction; (4) to use
a worksheet to make funding decisions among several rankings by vary-
ing the number of packages funded in each ranking thus adjusting the
funding levels; and (5) to identify cumulative funding levels in order to
judge the budget impact of approving any given number of packages.
All of these needs can be met through a simple, well-designed ranking
form, using the decision packages for backup information purposes.
The central problem of the ranking process is actually making
the resource allocation choices. Management has the need to make fund-
ing trade-offs among all activities in the organization that are compet-
ing for the same resources. The ranking process requires that all
spending plans, marginal and promising, be challenged. By ranking
all together, management is able to weed out marginal efforts and re-
direct the organization's resources toward the most promising ones.
n Pyhrr, p. 78.
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Two other problems, only indirectly related to the ranking
process but which have a direct bearing on two problems inherent in
the process (volume of decision packages for top management review
and evaluation of dissimilar functions) are organization productivity and
the growing complexity of staff functions. The primary responsibility
for driving the productivity of an organization falls to the management
staff. As efforts to improve productivity have increased, so has the
size of management staffs increased. As the size, sophistication, and
efforts of staffs have increased, the problems of managing staff functions
have become more complex, requiring more sophisticated management
efforts. While the costs of staff operations are direct and visible, the
benefits are often indirect and intangible. Zero-base budgeting estab-
lishes a link between the costs of staff efforts and the results (revenue,
profits, lower costs) of improved productivity and efficiency. Con-
sequently, the ranking process enables top management to allocate
and channel staff resources into the most worthwhile undertakings.
The inherent problem of volume of decision packages for top
management review is the most widely acclaimed difficulty associated
with zero-base budgeting. Management is faced with a dilemma. While
the volume problem faced by top management is undesirable (some say
impossible), ranking only at the cost center level is also unsatisfactory
for two reasons: (1) ranking at the cost-center level does not identify
to top management the trade-offs among cost centers or larger

organization units, and (2) lower level organization units are usually
too numerous for top management to make these trade-off themselves.
The solutions at this point are: (1) to limit the number of packages
ranked at any one level; (2) to limit the number of consolidation levels
and stop the consolidation process somewhere between the cost center
level and top management; and (3) to concentrate top management's
review on the lower priority, discretionary packages which fall on either
side of the funding level cutoff point.
The inherent problem of evaluating dissimilar functions by
managers who are unfamiliar with them can be difficult. It is partially
solved by answering the "Who should rank" question addressed above.
The problem can be magnified or reduced by management's ability and
willingness to make evaluations of dissimilar functions. The key to the
problem, however, is determining the basis for equitable comparisons.
What is required is to reach some agreement as to what measurements
are to be used and the value of each. Since costs are normally identified
in dollars, it is often best to identify benefits expressed in some dollar
measure also. Where other criteria are used, the budget staff should
translate these into a common dollar value. This will ensure a common
framework and common values for all concerned.
8. Summary
The problems attendant to the implementation of a zero-base




their interrelatedness. Cheek points out that any given plan of implement-
ation cited by the greatest number of organizations were issues more of
management focus and direction and less of the procedural mechanics
12
of the system itself. The issues most often cited were: inadequate
top management involvement, unrealistic management expectations,
mediocre quality and poor timeliness of decision package submissions,
insufficient feedback to decision unit managers, and inadequate or un-
clear planning assumptions underlying the budget proposals.
It appears pertinent at this point to consider a perspective on
the problems of implementing zero-base budgeting. While it may seem
banal to say that the difficulties of implementation can be overcome by
effective management actions, that is, in fact, the case. The value to
an organization of zero-base budgeting will be proved to an increasing
degree, but over time.
During the first year, an organization gets its feet wet in the
process. The results are about the same as would have been under the
traditional approach. A few perceptive managers recognize its value
and are quick to identify opportunities in their areas. There may be
broad resistance to the paperwork problem.
During the second year, the organization moves down the learn-
ing curve. With improvements in procedures, forms, and training,
12 Cheek, p. 163.
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more managers are aware of the concept and its process. They see that
carefully analyzed submissions get attention, and resources. Con-
sequently, the packages and resource allocation are improved.
During the third year, the organization moves to the flat area
of the learning curve. Only refresher training is necessary except for
new managers. Top management can now devote more time to follow-up
controls on the best packages from prior years and on setting up perform-
ance audits to monitor new programs. Restructuring the chart of accounts
becomes a plausible idea.
Implementation is now effectively completed and during sub-
sequent years, more benefits can be achieved.
The key point in this perspective is that the most critical period
occurs at the conclusion of the first year. It is usually at that point that
most of the frustrations have occurred while the benefits have not yet
been fully realized. The analogy to a capital project is appropriate:
Most of the costs have been incurred, but the benefits have yet to be
fully realized. Organizations which discard the concept after the first
year are usually blind to the implications of this perspective; they do
not realize the benefits are still to come.
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VI. NAVAL WEAPONS CENTER, CHINA LAKE
A. INTRODUCTION
This section describes the mission of Naval Weapons Center, China
Lake, and related information. In addition, it describes briefly the major
facilities, program work and resource flow underlying the operational
life of the center. Finally, it describes the basic organization structure
for budgeting purposes and characterizes the nature of zero-base budget-
ing implementation efforts to date.
B. MISSION AND RELATED INFORMATION
The mission of Naval Weapons Center is to be the principal Navy
research, development, test and evaluation center for air warfare
13
(except anti-submarine warfare systems) and missile weapon systems.
In keeping with its basic mission, the center conducts in-house
research, development, test, evaluation, and in-service engineering
support for many types of Navy and Marine Corps weapons systems.
The Center has the personnel and physical resources to develop a
weapons system from the initial concept to the operational system, and
then provide production and in-service support. Major areas of effort
are tactical weaponry systems and components, defense suppression,
air combat systems integration and support, and full spectrum test and
evaluation.
^Naval Weapons Center Information Brief, 30 September 1976
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The Center's major projects are at the advanced engineering develop-
ment level. Basic research work is concentrated in the fields of physics,
geophysics, propellant combustion, and general chemistry. The explora-
tory development program is centered in the strike warfare weaponry
area. The Center is the Navy's hub of excellence in propulsion develop-
ment for small tactical missiles. It is virtually the sole laboratory
working on fuses for the Navy's tactical guided missiles. It has con-
siderable experience in the field of target acquisition and missile
sensor/ seekers and leads the development of anti- radiation missiles.
The Center employs over 4, 500 permanent and temporary employees,
more than ninety percent of whom are civilian. The FY 1977 operating
budget was $227 million, with approximately two-thirds of all funding
coming from the Naval Air Systems Command.
C. MAJOR FACILITIES
The Center is located in the upper Mojave Desert of eastern
California and consists of over one million acres of desert land with
restricted airspace several times that size extending over the sur-
rounding area.
The Center has thirty major test facilities available along with
extensive test support services. These facilities include: Air Operations
Ranges, Missile Firing Ranges, Missile Ballistics Ranges, Fuse Ranges,
Supersonic Test Tracks, Explosive Test Ranges, Propulsion Test Ranges,
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an Electronic "Warfare Tactical Environment Simulation Facility, an
Electro -Optical Field Laboratory, an Aircraft Survivability Range, an
Aircraft Carrier Conflagration Control Test Facility, and a Surface
Weapons Evaluation Facility.
The Naval Weapons Center has extensive laboratory facilities for
the research, development, test and evaluation of weapons systems and
warfare related technologies. These laboratories include: Michelson
Laboratory, a complex of facilities used for research in chemistry,
physics, mathematics, aerophysics, electronics, metallurgy, ballistics,
and development work on propulsion, fire control and guidance systems;
propulsion laboratories; a solid state research and development facility;
and Lauritsen Laboratory, used primarily for laser and related optical
systems research and development.
The Center has complete technical support services available to
back up its mission, including instrumentation, aircraft modification,
data reduction, meteorological, telemetry, computing, and machine
shop services.
D. PROGRAM WORK
Program effort is directed toward air warfare systems and missile
weapon systems. The principal areas of effort and their associated
programs are systems development, production support and product
assurance, and fleet in-service support as follows: anti-air missiles,
71

anti- surface weapons, tactical aircraft combat systems, and develop-
mental and operational test and evaluation.
E. RESOURCES
Summarizing the resource flow at Naval Weapons Center entails a
description of the sources of funds by provider and type, and the distribu-
tion of funds by expense category.
The FY 1977 budget of $227 million in New Obligational Authority was
provided by the five major sources listed below with an approximate
percentage contribution as follows: (1) Naval Air Systems Command, 71%;
(2) Other Navy sources, 12%; (3) Naval Sea Systems Command, 8%;
(4) other sources, 5%; and (5) Director of Navy Laboratories, 4%.
The source of funds detailed by appropriation is as follows: (1) the
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy Appropriation sup-
plied over $150 of the budget, slightly more than 66% of the total (Of this,
nearly $51 million, or slightly more than 22% of the total, was designated
for Management and Support); (2) the Weapons Procurement, Navy Appro-
priation supplied $25 million, approximately 11% of the total; (3) the
Operations and Maintenance, Navy Appropriation provided nearly $10
million, over 4% of the total; (4) the Aircraft Procurement Navy Appro-
priation supplied over $6.5 million, nearly 3% of the total; and (5) other
sources provided almost $36 million, nearly 16% of the total.
The FY 1977 distribution of funds by expense category was as follows:
(1) Direct Labor, $62 million, 27%; (2) Direct Material and Travel, $19
72

million, 8%; (3) Contracts, $91 million, 40%; (4) Equipment, $6 million,
3%; (5) Indirect Expense, $15 million, 7%; and (6) General Expense,
$34 million, 15%.
F. BASIC ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
The basic organization structure of Naval Weapons Center is depicted
in Figure 1 on page 74. The Center uses zero-base budgeting for over-
head costs. For purposes of budgeting overhead costs, the Budget
Division of the Finance and Management Department separates the Center
into Support Departments and Technical Departments. For Support
Departments, the entire budget is- considered General and Administrative
Overhead, while in the Technical Departments only Cost Center Overhead
is budgeted using the zero-base process, the direct expense budget being
otherwise allocated. The Test and Evaluation Departments do not
participate in the zero-base budgeting process. Figure 2 on page 75
provides a listing of the Support and Technical Departments used for the
FY 1978 budget call. It includes a detailed listing of the Finance and
Management Department.
Each Support and Technical Department has assigned to it a
Resource Management Analyst (RMA) from the RMA Branch, Budget
Division, of the Finance and Management Department. These analysts
normally are permanently assigned to and physically located in their







NAVAL WEAPONS CENTER - DEPARTMENTAL LISTING
SUPPORT DEPARTMENTS (G & A OVERHEAD)
Code Department
01 Command
8 Finance and Management
081 Weapons Systems Cost Analysis Division
082 Management Division
83 Budget Division
0831 Reports and Analysis Branch
0832 Resource Management Analysis Branch
0833 Test and Evaluation Branch
86 Financial Operation Division





24 Safety and Security
25 Supply
26 Public Works












integrate the budget staff with other support and technical departments
and facilitate better communications, budget development, and resource
allocation.
G. ZERO-BASE BUDGETING IMPLEMENTATION
The initial efforts of top management to use the zero-base budgeting
process were the cost-reduction campaigns conducted on the magnetic
card typewriters and the computers throughout the installation. The
first efforts to implement zero-base budgeting throughout a department
were made during the EY 1977 Mid-Year Review conducted in December,
1976. Two departments, a Support department (Finance and Management)
and a Technical department (Weapons), were selected for the pilot test.
These two departments conducted the FY 1977 Mid- Year Review using
the zero-base budgeting process. The pilot test resulted in two items of
significance: first was the decision to write the budget call by com-
mittee; second was a list of ten lessons learned from the pilot test.
The decision to write the budget call by committee came about in
order to reduce the frustration with and distrust of the Budget Division
by department managers and staffs as a result of the cost-reduction
campaigns and the pilot test. The inclusion of heads of departments
and staff representatives in the budget call formulation was designed to
improve interdepartmental communications, trust, and cooperation.
The ten lessons learned were: (1) Decision package definition is
critical. Decision units were difficult to define; managers got bogged
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down in detail doing decision unit analysis and decision package formula-
tion, and the organization unit tended to become the decision unit; (2)
Mid-Year Review is not a good time to implement zero-base budgeting.
Reformulating the current year budget in zero-base terms appeared to
be an exercise in which the costs, in terms of time and effort, exceeded
the benefits; (3) The process required too much paperwork for budget
purposes. It was nevertheless evaluated as a good management tool;
(4) Management must identify level of activities below the current level;
(5) Incremental levels must consider travel, materials, and labor - not
just labor; (6) Top management should ensure that decision unit managers
understand the objectives of zero-base budgeting; (7) Top management
should assure the priority of zero-base budgeting and make sure it
happens; (8) Zero-base budgeting provides visibility to the department
head of functions performed at the branch level and below; (0) Too many
packages were formulated and the volume was difficult to manage;
(10) The process was not as expensive, in terms of time and effort, as
the pilot test managers anticipated. However, the refining and retyping
14
of decision packages was deemed wasteful.
Item (6) of the lessons learned resulted in specific education efforts
by the Personnel and Organization Development Division. Key staff
14These lessons learned were presented in an unpublished command




members were sent to American Management Association Seminars on
zero-base budgeting and Naval Postgraduate School was requested to
develop and conduct on-site seminars for staff and management
personnel.
The FY 1978 Overhead Budget Call, issued in early August, 1977,
included all support and technical departments in the zero-base process
for the first time.
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VII. CONDUCT OF RESEARCH
A. INTRODUCTION
The research performed for this study was done from March
through November of 1977. The investigation included: (1) a literature
survey; (2) observations, conversations, and interviews in conjunction
with the seminars given by the Naval Postgraduate School at the Naval
Weapons Center from May to September of 1977; (3) formulation of the
general hypothesis that Naval Weapons Center was experiencing problems
implementing zero-base budgeting, most of which could be predicted
from information contained in the theoretical literature; (4) develop-
ment of a questionnaire to test the hypothesis; (5) circulation of the
questionnaire to a target population; and (6) analysis of responses to
the questionnaire and the interviews conducted in conjunction with its
circulation.
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH INVESTIGATION
The literature survey was conducted over a six month period
beginning in March of 1977. The survey consisted of periodical
literature articles, newspaper articles, correspondence with organiza-
tions implementing zero-base budgeting, and the few books which have
considered the subject.
The request from Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, for the
Naval Postgraduate School to present training seminars on zero-base
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budgeting carried with it the recognition of implementation difficulties
significant enough to warrant external assistance. The observations,
discussions, and interviews which occurred in conjunction with multiple
offerings of the seminar were used initially to identify significant prob-
lem areas and later to substantiate specific beliefs and complaints.
The correlation between the problems, frustrations, and specific
complaints expressed by Naval Weapons Center management and budget
personnel and the problem areas identified in the theoretical literature
gave rise to the general hypothesis stated above. From the general
hypothesis was developed the two-element problem statement central to
the conduct of this study and restated here: First, does correct imple-
mentation of zero-base budgeting, with respect to the theoretical writings,
lead to expected satisfactory results? Second, does incorrect imple-
mentation lead to expected problems?
The questionnaire was developed to identify the problems of imple-
mentation. A number of intentions were reflected in its design. The
first intention of the survey was to compare responses based on depart-
ment overhead budget size in order to determine whether or not this
factor affected the effectiveness of zero-base budgeting. The four
categories used in question one of the questionnaire (See Appendix C)
were derived from analysis of data concerning the relative sizes of the
various departmental overhead budgets which were obtained in an inter-
view with the Head of the Reports and Analysis Branch of the Budget
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Division. Sufficient responses were not received to allow proper analysis
in each size category. Consequently, analysis was necessarily restricted
to only two categories, those departments with budgets greater than and
less than $4, 000, 000. Data from selected questions analyzed using
this category breakdown are presented in the next section of this study.
The second intention of the survey was to compare and evaluate the
views of budget analysts experienced in incremental budgeting and zero-
base budgeting at Naval Weapons Center with those of budget analysts
who worked only with the zero-base system. Data from selected ques-
tions analyzed using this comparison are also presented in the next
section.
A third intention of the questionnaire was to identify the problems of
implementing zero-base budgeting experienced at the Center by using
two types of questions, unstructured and structured. The unstructured
questions were designed to give managers and budget staff the opportunity
to identify freely the problems they actually experienced, without refer-
ence to any anticipated or expected response. This, in conjunction with
the confidential treatment of the survey, was deemed to be the most
likely way to elicit accurate and candid answers. The structured ques-
tions, adapted from the questionnaire used by Minmier in his Georgia
study, were designed to compare and evaluate the opinions of managers
and budget staff with respect to the time required for the zero-base
process, management involvement, the effectiveness of implementation
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planning and guidelines, the availability of data for decision package
formulation, the effectiveness of the zero-base process in affecting
resource allocation decisions, the effect of the zero-base system on
the quality of management information, feedback to decision unit man-
agers regarding changes by top management in decision package rankings,
the validity of minimum level of effort packages, and the future use of
the zero-base budgeting system at Naval Weapons Center. Selected
responses to these two types of questions are also presented in the next
section of the study.
Based on the literature survey and the information gathering done
in conjunction with the seminars, a number of expectations, with respect
to the questionnaire responses, were developed.
First, it was expected that the respondents would be generally dis-
satisfied with the implementation efforts at the time of the survey.
This expectation was based on the steepness of the first-year learning
curve and the fact that few benefits could be seen following the expenditure
of a great deal of time and effort on the budget. Second, it was expected
that some degree of dissatisfaction with implementation planning and
guidance on the part of top management and the budget staff would be
expressed. Third, it was expected that the respondents would report
that a major problem was the volume of paperwork required to perform
the analysis of alternatives and the ranking of decision packages. Fourth,
it was expected that some managers and budget staff would believe that
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zero-base budgeting was merely an exercise in paperwork designed to
satisfy top management's desires to improve budgeting methods. Fifth,
it was expected that some managers would report increased awareness
of and control over the functions for which they were responsible due to
their involvement in the budget process.
Selection of the target population in which the questionnaire was
circulated was aimed at achieving a balanced sampling of opinions from
a group knowledgeable in the subject of zero-base budgeting. The
questionnaire was circulated to the Resource Management Analysts in
sixteen departments. Also, questionnaires were distributed to Depart-
ment Heads and Division Managers in each of the two types of depart-
ments employing zero-base budgeting: Technical (Code 31 - Systems
Development) and Support (Code 25 - Supply). The Test and Evaluation
Directorate was not participating in the zero-base budgeting process
at the time of this survey. Samples of the cover letter memorandum,
the instruction sheet, and the questionnaire are presented in Appendixes
A, B, and C, respectively.
A number of interviews were conducted in conjunction with the
circulation of the questionnaire. Key budget staff members, partic-
ularly the Reports and Analysis and the Resource Management Analysis
Branch Heads; selected Department Heads; Heads of Staff; and line
managers provided the author with a clear understanding of the zero-base
process used at Naval Weapons Center and the major problem areas
experienced in its implementation.
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The analysis of questionnaire responses was essentially a comparison
between the problems reflected in the replies received and the problems
expected as a result of the study of the theoretical literature and this
analysis will be presented in a later section of the study.
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VIII. PRESENTATION OF DATA
A. INTRODUCTION
This section will present the data that was obtained from twenty-
five survey questionnaires that were completed and returned by the
budget analysts and managers at Naval Weapons Center, China Lake.
This represents a response rate of 45. 5%. Six different displays are
used to exhibit the data. Table I presents an aggregate summary of
responses to the survey questionnaire. The distribution of responses
for each question is shown by number of responses and percent of total
responses received for that particular question.
Table II shows selected responses based on the size of departmental
overhead budget, using $4, 000, 000 as a dividing point. As previously
noted, one of the original intentions of the survey was to compare
responses based on department overhead budget size. The range of
these overhead budgets was from just under one half millions dollars
to over nine and one half million. The four categories selected were
intended to provide a group of four equally sized sets of responses upon
which analysis could be made. Sufficient responses were not received
to allow proper analysis in each category. Consequently, analysis
was necessarily restricted to two categories, those departments with
an overhead budget greater than and less than $4, 000, 000. This grouping
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arrangement provided two reasonably equal sets of responses. The
questions selected were chosen for the statistical distribution of their
responses, which varied significantly from the aggregate distribution.
The variant character of these responses makes them candidates
for analysis. In each of the two categories of department size, the
distribution of responses is 'shown by number of responses and percent
of total responses received in that particular category. Additionally,
the total number of responses, and a percentage breakdown of that total,
is shown for each question. This repetition of the aggregate data from
Table I is done merely to assist the reader in correlating the data
shown in the various displays.
Table III presents selected responses based on whether or not the
respondent participated in the original implementation of zero-base
budgeting. The same display format is used here as in Table II.
The last three displays deal with the written comments of respond-
ents. These comments are summarized for the two unstructured ques-
tions (numbers 4 and 5 on the questionnaire) in Table IV, for the
structured questions which elicited comments (numbers 10, 14, 15, 16,
and 19) in Table V, and for the General Comments sheet at the back of
the questionnaire in Table VI. In these displays, the Response Data
gives a brief statistical look at the relative magnitude of responses to a
particular question, using the 25 returned questionnaires as a base.
The Response Summary provides a condensed, abridged version of all
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the comments received regarding a particular question. These sum-
maries were created using a great deal of subjective evaluation and
interpretation. The written comments, the opinions and beliefs of the
respondents, were read, summarized, interpreted, compiled, and
displayed by the author, to show the range and depth of attitudes and
beliefs held by the respondents without excessive detail. Often, similar
responses were grouped together and the number of responses within
a given category of comments were given in parentheses to provide the
reader with a better understanding of the major attitudes and beliefs
pervading the target population. There is no relationship between the
number of responses shown in the Response Summary and the number
shown in the Response Data display. Many responses expressed
several problems or attitudes or beliefs which could be interpreted any
number of ways. Several comments were seemingly inappropriate to
the question and were consequently omitted from the summary.
B. PRESENTATION OF DATA





SUMMARY OF RESPONSES - AGGREGATE
Question TOTAL
Number No. %
1. Size of Department based on FY-77
allocation of funds for indirect
expenses:
>$4,000,000 9 36.0
> $2, 000, 000 12 48.0
>$ 1,000, 000 2 8.0
<$ 1,000, 000 2 8.0
2. Were you "budget analyst" of your




3. In your opinion, is ZBB an
improvement over the previous
budget system at NWC?
Yes 5 20.0
No 14 5 6.0
Uncertain 6 24.0
6. What effect did the ZBB system
have on the time and effort spent
in budget preparation during the
first year of its implementation?
Increased considerably 20 83.3
Increased slightly 3 12.5







7. Now that the ZBB system has been
implemented, how great is the time
and effort spent in budget preparation
in comparison to the previous budget
system?
Much greater 13 61.9
Slightly more 6 2 8. 6
About the same 2 9.5
Slightly less
Much less
Did the Department Head become
more involved in budget formulation
after implementation of ZBB?
Much more involved 3 12.5
Slightly more involved 5 20.8
About the same 14 58.3
Slightly less involved 1 4.2
Much less involved 1 4.2
9. Did the first- line supervisors
become more involved in budget
formulation after the implementa-
tion of ZBB?
Much more involved 13 52.0
Slightly more involved 3 12.0
About the same 9 3 6.0
Slightly less involved
Much less involved
10. Do you feel adequate advance plan-
ning on the part of Department 08
was conducted before implementa-










11. Do you feel you received adequate
instructions during the first year








12. Do you feel you presently have adequate
instructions as to how to properly







13. During the first year of operating with
the ZBB system did you have adequate











14. Do you feel you presently have adequate











15. Did implementation of the ZBB system
cause a shifting of financial resources

















16. All good management systems generate
information for management planning
and control. What effect did the ZBB
system have on the quality of manage-
ment information as compared to the
previous budget system?
Substantially improved 1 4.8
Slightly improved 7 33.3
About the same 10 47. 6
Slightly decreased 3 14.3
Substantially decreased
17. After your department has submitted
its decision package rankings for
executive review, are you notified
of any changes in these rankings
and the reason for the change?
Always 2 2 5.0
Most of the time 2 2 5.0
Seldom
Never 4 5 0.0
18. Presently, you are required to prepare
decision packages representing different
levels of effort for each function. Do
you feel it is practical to prepare a









19. This study is very interested in your
opinion of the zero-base budgeting
system. Which of the following
choices do you feel is in the best
interest of NWC, China Lake?
Continue the ZBB system substantially
as it operates today.
Continue the ZBB system with some
major modifications.
Continue the ZBB system except that
it not be employed every year.








SELECTED RESPONSES BY SIZE OF DEPARTMENT




<$4,000,000 > $4, 000, 000 TOTAL
No. % No. % No. %
3. In your opinion, is
ZBB an improvement
over the previous




3 18.8 2 22.2 5 20.0
12 75. 2 22.2 14 56.0
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6 37.5 7 77. 8 13 52.0
2 12.5 1 11. 1 3 12.





<$4, 000,000 > $4, 000,000 TOTAL
No. % No. % No. %
13. During the first year
of operating with the
ZBB system, did you







9 60.0 2 33.3 11 52.4
5 33.3 2 33.3 7 33.3
1 6.7 2 33.3 3 14.3
14. Do you feel you presently







12 75.0 2 28.6 14 60. 9
4 25. 3 42. 8 7 30.4
2 28.6 2 8.7
16. All good management sys-
tems generate information
for management planning
and control. What effect
did the ZBB system have
on the quality of manage-
ment information as








3 20.0 4 66.6
9 60.0 1 16.7











Question <$4, 000, 000 > $4, 000, 000 TOTAL
Number No. % No. % No. %
19. This study is very inter-
ested in your opinion of
the zero-base budgeting
system. Which of the
following choices do you
feel is in the best interest
of NWC, China Lake?
Continue the ZBB system
substantially as it
operates today 1 7.2 2 28.6 3 14.3
Continue the ZBB sys-
tem with some major
modifications 3 21.4 2 2 8.6 5 23.8
Continue the ZBB sys-
tem except that it not
be employed every
year 3 21.4 1 14.2 4 19.0
Discontinue the ZBB




SELECTED RESPONSES BASED ON
PARTICIPATION OR NON-PARTICIPATION
IN ORIGINAL IMPLEMENTATION OF ZERO- BASE BUDGETING
BUDGET ANALYST PARTICIPATING










6. What effect did the ZBB
system have on the time
and effort spent in budget
preparation during the
















11. Do you feel you received
adequate instructions dur-
ing the first year of ZBB





8 61.5 2 16.7 10 40.
5 38.5 9 75.0 14 56.0
1 8.3 1 4.0
14. Do you feel you presently
have adequate cost data
necessary to properly




5 41.7 9 81. 8 14 60.9
5 41.7 2 18.2 7 30.4














19. This survey is very inter-
ested in your opinion of
the zero-base budgeting
system. Which of the
following choices do you
feel is in the best interest
of NWC, China Lake?
Continue the ZBB system
substantially as it op-
erates today
Continue the ZBB system
with some major
modifications 2 2 0.0
Continue the ZBB system
except that it not be















SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO UNSTRUCTURED QUESTIONS
ABOUT
PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED AND BENEFITS IDENTIFIED
DURING IMPLEMENTATION
QUESTION #4: List the major problems you have experienced or know
about resulting from the implementation of ZBB at
NWC, China Lake. Briefly describe each.
RESPONSE DATA: 23 of 25 responses stated problems (92%)
2 of 25 responses were blank ( 8%)
RESPONSE SUMMARY:
Problem Description (Number of responses, if more than one)
1. Paperwork (6)
2. Line managers not involved (5)
3. Lack of guidance in preparing decision packages (4)
4. Implementation/budget preparation timetable too short (3)
5. Inadequate training (3)
6. Inadequate preparation for implementation (2)
7. Lack of definition of goals (2)
8. Difficulty defining decision units (2)
9. Required increase in budget preparation time (2)
10. Too many people involved (2)




.. rammed down peoples' throats"
12. NWC process is not really zero-based (2)
- (Base-line and Increment line)
- "I feel a lot of base-line could be cut also. "
13. Lack of flexibility due to government regulations (2)
14. Double standard; separation of functional package approvals
from personnel ceilings and travel guidelines (2)
15. Required a major learning exercise to understand
16. Inconsistencies between training and budget staff advice
17. Decisions by wrong people - should be Department, not
Code 08
18. ZBB raises unrealistic expectations about management
involvement in budget process
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19. Irritates Department Heads - encourages "gaming"
20. ZBB process is easy to "game"
21. Department Head would not submit incremental decision
packages
22. Department Head would not rank packages
23. Division Heads do not have adequate background to do
groundwork for zero-base budget
24. Realistic alternative methods difficult to define
25. ZBB is not useful for decisions about major operating areas
26. ZBB is not useful in technical departments
27. Hard to rearrange priorities after original submissions
28. Hard to monitor various submissions; there is little
uniformity between submissions of different departments
29. Arbitrary decisions by "bosses" degraded the whole concept
30. Widespread negative attitude degraded the "practice" of ZBB
31. Process puts peculiar burden on managers who try to do
things "right"
32. Honest managers wind up with "bare-bones" budgets
33. Managers have very little discretionary funds
a. salaries are largest part of budget
b. line managers/ supervisors don't have ability to pick
and choose Civil Service Employees
c. Therefore, decision-makers cannot match dollars
to functions, except on the basis of personnel.
Changes in personnel ceilings cause problems.
34. Difficulty extracting prior-year expense data for
formulating decision packages at Division/ Branch level
35. Extra effort to convert functional decision packages
to the reporting system which uses objects of expense
36. Too much effort for no apparent benefit
37. "The standard criticism is that we went into a vast program
with half-vast preparation and training. "
QUESTION #5: List the major benefits you have experienced or know
about resulting from the implementation of ZBB at
NWC China Lake. Briefly describe each.
RESPONSE DATA: 13 of 25 responses stated positive benefits (52%)
3 of 25 responses stated doubts about or
hopes of benefits (12%)
5 of 25 responses stated "none" (20%)
4 of 25 responses were blank (16%)
RESPONSE SUMMARY:
Benefit Description (Number of responses, if more than one)
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1. More line managers were involved in the budget process (3)
2. Line managers have a better view of the overall cost of
operations (2)
3. Managers have a better understanding of budget principles (2)
4. There was an increased awareness of organization priorities
primarily in the Support Departments.
5. Managers have a better view of the overall problems of the
organization
6. Managers know more about where and when dollars are being
spent. They are aware of overhead needs and costs
7. Supervisors were forced to think about their work functions
8. The scrutiny of functions and testing for validity of overhead
costs enabled managers to determine what functions could be
eliminated without crippling the department's mission effort.
9. Branch managers know more about the financial operations
of their functional areas and are more aware of budget
constraints.
10. ZBB is a useful planning tool; it is an improvement over the
previous system
11. If the people making the budget have the desire, ZBB can
be used to present a more coherent, organized explanation
of their budget request
12. It is easier to complete the budget forms after the packages
are done
13. "I believe that ZBB will be more effective if the Center




SUMMARY OF COMMENT RESPONSES
TO SELECTED STRUCTURED QUESTIONS
QUESTION #10: Do you feel adequate advance planning on the part of
Department 08 was conducted before implementation
of new ZBB system?
RESPONSE DATA: 16 of 25 responses conveyed comments (64%)
9 of 25 responses were blank (36%)
RESPONSE SUMMARY:
Comment Description (Number of responses, if more than one)
1. Inadequate guidelines were given to budget and staff depart-
mental line managers involved in the budget process. (8)
2. Code 08 personnel and departmental staff and managers had
difficulty understanding and/or explaining ZBB and how to
implement it. (5)
3. Too much time was taken to prepare the budget call. (4)
4. Code 08 tried hard to plan things well. (4)
5. Not enough time was allotted for Code 08 to do advance
planning. (3)
6. Unrealistic deadlines and expectations of top management
made respondents feel that "ZBB was crammed down our
collective throats. " (2)
7. The redirection of efforts caused by Code 08 changing
guidelines after they were issued kept budget staff and
line managers "off balance. " (2)
8. Communication was poor. (2)
9. Training was inadequate.
10. Not enough time was allotted to review and rework decision
packages.
QUESTION #14: Do you feel you presently have adequate cost data
necessary to properly prepare a decision package?
RESPONSE DATA: 7 of 25 responses conveyed comments (28%)





1. Presently, costs are not collected by the functional area,
however, they will be in FY-78.
2. Hard to track prior years - don't know how much contracts
will cost.
3. We will need some revised financial reports to get helpful
cost breakouts - some revisions are in process.
4. The billing system, in some cases, doesn't lend itself to
breaking costs out to the proper function they support.
The budget is still a product of the Analyst vice the Manager.
QUESTION #15: Did implementation of the ZBB system cause a shifting
of resources among functions in your department?
RESPONSE DATA: 8 of 25 responses conveyed comments (32%)
17 of 25 responses were blank (68%)
RESPONSE SUMMARY:
Comment Description (Number of responses, if more than one)
1. Too soon to tell. (3)
2. Certainly a shifting of ''control/responsibility. "
3. We are already operating with a minimum dollar amount
in our department.
4. We had our own little system. ZBB simply formalized it
and provided forms and format.
5. How could it? Management didn't read it. Department heads
had the same two hours available for budget review they've
always had and there was too much material to digest.
QUESTION #16: All good management systems generate information
for management planning and control. What effect
did the zero-base budgeting system have on the
quality of management information as compared to
the previous budgeting system?
RESPONSE DATA: 8 of 25 responses conveyed comments (32%)
17 of 25 responses were blank (68%)
RESPONSE SUMMARY:
Comment Description (Number of responses, if more than one)
1. Unable to see any effect. (2)
2. Too early to tell (2)
3. Quality decreased due to lack of communication, foul-ups in
getting the word out to all concerned; the usual first time
around problems of education and implementation.
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4. Quality increased only because we had the desire and intent
to use ZBB as a vehicle to improve it. Such improvement is
not inherent to the system.
5. Improvement is possible if department heads and top manage-
ment really use the information available.
QUESTION #19: This study is very interested in your opinion of the
zero-base budgeting system. Which of the following
choices do you feel is in the best interest of NWC,
China Lake?
RESPONSE DATA: 14 of 25 responses conveyed comments (56%)
11 of 25 responses were blank (44%)
RESPONSE SUMMARY:
Comment Description (Number of responses, if more than one)
1. Too early to tell; need more time to evaluate it. (7)
2. The extra work didn't produce any benefits. (3)
3. Our process, with base-lines and increment lines, is not
really a zero-base system.
4. The implementation time frame was too short. Code 08
spent a lot of time trying to publish a good budget call by
involving all the various department and staff people. I
don't feel the call was any better, it just took longer.
5. The large amount of "gaming" could be eliminated by a
hard-nosed review.
6. The process should be used in the support departments only.
7. The ZBB system should be used as an Overhead budgeting
process. only, not as a cost-cutting tool (the typewriter fiasco).
8. Our ZBB system bears no relationship to overhead generated.
9. ZBB should be an optional technique used in applications





TO GENERAL COMMENTS SECTION
GENERAL COMMENTS
RESPONSE DATA: 10 of 25 responses conveyed comments (40%)
15 of 25 responses were blank (60%)
RESPONSE SUMMARY:
Comment Description
1. If ZBB results in a real improvement in understanding about
the major overhead users (the Support Departments), then
we'll have a handle on the utility of the system.
2. The process of combining, amalgamating, and condensing
the input and rankings from the depths of the organization
is critical, peculiar to the organization and managers in
question, poorly systematized, and little understood.
3. The value of ZBB has been to the line managers who have
been forced to think about things which, previously, they
were willing to let lie. The method of defining needs and
establishing priorities has been good for line managers.
They have a better understanding and appreciation for the
budgeting process. Their "hands-on" experience has been
beneficial.
4. I have a very positive attitude toward ZBB. I could have
gotten a great deal of gratification from using it had I not
had to witness the agony of so many others.
5. We needed more time to prepare the budget.
6. ZBB is OK but more practice is needed by first-line
supervisors, particularly in cost matters. Cost data is
often difficult to obtain.
7. The Typewriter /Computer cost-cutting calls gave ZBB a
bad name. Those events tended to reduce the authority of
line managers - contrary to ZBB.
8. My concern is about the frustration of line managers created
by the lack of adequate instructions /directions from higher
levels and the frequent changes to those instructions.
9. I'm not convinced that ZBB is an improvement over our
previous overhead budgeting methods. It did not get our




10. I thought the primary purpose of ZBB was to start with zero
and build a budget. We had three constraints to this: (1)
prior year experience had to be listed; (2) base-line and
increment-line figures were determined using historical
cost data and the ability of each cost center to generate
overhead rather than actual needs; and (3) the reporting
system uses objects of expense while the budget system is
based on functions. To me, the end result appeared to be
a new way to come up with the same old budget figures.
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IX. ANALYSIS OF DATA
A. INTRODUCTION
This section will present an analysis of the data displayed in the
preceding section. First, an analysis of the aggregate summary of
responses to the zero-base budgeting questionnaire (Table I) will be
shown. Next will be an analysis of selected responses by size of
department, based on FY-77 allocation of funds for indirect expenses
(Table II). Third will be an analysis of selected responses based on
respondent participation or non-participation in original implementation
of zero-base budgeting (Table III). Fourth, some comments on responses
to the two unstructured questions (Table IV) will be presented, and
finally, some comments on Tables V and VI will be made.
B. ANALYSIS OF THE AGGREGATE SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO
THE ZERO-BASE BUDGETING QUESTIONNAIRE (Table I)
The distribution of responses to Question 3 clearly reflected
moderate dissatisfaction with the zero-base system among the members
of the population. The 24 percent of the population who were uncertain
about the relative quality of the zero-base system over the previous
budgeting system implied a balanced skepticism about the new system.
The 80 percent who were either uncertain or held a negative opinion
about Question 3 substantiates the earlier expectation that the end of
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of the first year would be the most difficult period during the implementa-
tion process.
Cross-analyzing; in Question 3, only 20 percent of the population
felt that zero-base budgeting was an improvement over the previous
system yet, in Question 19, 57. 1 percent of the population decided the
best interests of Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, would be served
by continuing the zero-base system in one form or another. The mixed
implications of these responses implied that the uncertainty among the
target population was possibly higher than the responses indicated. The
42.9 percent response in Question 19 to discontinue the system was
again consistent with the expectation that the greatest resistance to the
system would arise at the end of the first year.
Questions 6 and 7 clearly showed that the respondents believed
zero-base budgeting increased the time and effort spent in budget
preparation. The differential in response distribution between the two
questions reveals a small movement down the learning curve following
the two -department, zero-base budgeting introduction experience in
December of 1976.
Questions 8 and 9 indicate that a third of the respondents believed
that department heads, and nearly two-thirds believed the first-line
supervisors, became more involved in the budget formulation process
after the implementation of zero-base budgeting than had been the case
previously. This greater management involvement supported the
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prediction of increased awareness about, and control over, the functions
for which the managers were responsible. A cross-analysis of the nine
responses to Answer Number 4 (Discontinue ZBB) on Question 19 was
performed on these two questions. For Question 8, no significant pro-
portionate distribution differences were found between the nine who chose
to discontinue the system in Question 19 and the aggregate population of
24 in Question 8. For Question 9, however, the response distributions
of the nine respondents in Question 19 and those of the aggregate popula-
tion of 25 in Question 9 were significantly different. Of the nine respond-
ents, one third (3 of 9) indicated much more involvement by the first-
line supervisors (the remaining six all indicated 'About the same"
involvement). A comparison between the two distributions (the 33.3
percent of the nine responses to Question 19 and the 64. percent - 12
percent "Slightly more" plus 52 percent "Much more" - of the aggregate
population in Question 9) of increased supervisory-involvement, implies
that those recommending discontinuance of the zero-base budgeting
system had seen much less change in first-line supervisory involvement
than the population as a whole.
Regarding Question 10, the reader is first referred to Table V for
a summary of the comments which were made. A preponderance of the
population stated that the Office of Finance and Management, Code 08,
did not conduct adequate planning before implementation of the zero-base
budgeting system. The primary problems related to guidance, under-
standing, and ability to explain zero-base budgeting. Nearly all the
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comments were in line with the expectation that dissatisfaction with the
zero-base implementation efforts would manifest itself as criticism of
the planning and guidance on the part of top management and the budget
s taff
.
The effect of training and instruction in zero-base budgeting tech-
niques was reflected in Questions 11 and 12. The ratio of respondents
who felt inadequately trained or uncertain about their knowledge of zero-
base budgeting to the total population dropped from 60. percent in
Question 1 1 to 45. 8 percent in Question 12. Generally, this occurred
during the period between December, 1976 and August, 1977. This
decrease was most likely the result of internal training programs,
contractor-provided instruction, the Naval Postgraduate School seminars,
and self-instruction on the part of many individuals involved with zero-
base budgeting at China Lake.
Questions 13 and 14 revealed a slight improvement in the availability
of cost data necessary to prepare an adequate decision package. The
reader is referred to Table V for a summary of the comments made on
Question 14.
Question 15 indicated that over 26 percent of the respondents expe-
rienced some shifting of resources among the functions performed in
their departments, yet the summary of comments (Table V) made on
this question tended to reflect the preponderant response that no apparent
shifting of resources occurred. A cross-analysis was performed between
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Question 19, Answer Number 4 (Discontinue ZBB), and this question.
Of the nine respondents who wanted to discontinue the zero-base system
in Question 19, eight had responded to Question 15; and the distribution
of their responses approximated proportionately the responses of the
aggregate population to that question. A cross-analysis of the three
response categories in Question 19 which recommended continuing the
zero-base system was performed on Question 15 also. Distribution of
those 12 responses from Question 19 likewise approximated, proportionately,
the responses of the aggregate population to Question 15. No correlation
between either acceptance or rejection of zero-base budgeting and re-
allocation of resources could be found.
Eight of the 21 respondents (38. 1 percent) to Question 16 perceived
an improvement in the quality of management information. This improve-
ment bears out the expectation that some managers would report increased
awareness of and control over their functional areas of responsibility.
The summary of comments made (Table V) reveals a mixed view.
Question 17 was deleted from consideration for analysis because it
was subsequently deemed to not have been an appropriate question at the
time of the survey because the ranking process had not yet been started
at the Center.
The distribution of responses to Question 18 implies that a majority
of the population understands the concept of a minimum level of effort
package as it relates to the process of zero-base budgeting. That the
significance of the minimum level of effort package was understood by
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respondents is best shown by the comments (particularly Comment Num-
ber 3 for Question 19 in Table V and Comment Number 10 in Table VI)
made about the base-line and increment-line figures which were imposed
as budget guidelines. The respondents who commented seemed to think
that the base-line/increment-line amounts defined the range outside
which decision packages would not be reviewed. This was substantiated
by the center budget call memorandum. The avowed purpose of the
base -line /increment- line amounts was to control the number of packages
presented for detailed review. The existence of such guidelines, which
may serve well as a control mechanism over the number of decision
packages to be reviewed, nevertheless alters the character of the budget
process from a true zero-base system to a modification thereof.
Question 19 reflects the expected dissatisfactions with zero-base
budgeting at the end of the first year of its implementation. This ques-
tion has been cross-analyzed with Questions 3, 8, 9, and 15. As noted
previously, 57. 1 percent of the 21 respondents recommended that the
best interests of Naval Weapons Center, China Lake would be served by
continuing the zero-base system.
C. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED RESPONSES BY SIZE OF DEPARTMENT
BASED ON FISCAL YEAR 1977 ALLOCATION OF FUNDS FOR
INDIRECT EXPENSES (TABLE II)
Question 3 revealed that respondents from departments with smaller
overhead budgets, which tended to be the technical departments, con-
sidered zero-base budgeting to be no improvement over the previous
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system. Conversely, those respondents from departments with larger
overhead budgets, generally the support departments, tended to be more
uncertain about the value of the zero-base system.
Question 8 showed that, while approximately an equal number of
respondents reported the department head's involvement was about the
same, those respondents in departments with smaller budgets experienced
much more department head involvement while those respondents in the
departments with larger budgets reported a decrease in department head
involvement.
Question 9 disclosed that, in the departments with bigger overhead
budgets, significantly more first-line supervisors were involved in
budget formulation than was the case in the departments with smaller
overhead budgets.
Questions 13 and 14 revealed that significantly more respondents in
departments with smaller overhead budgets had adequate cost data neces-
sary to properly prepare decision packages than did respondents in
departments with larger overhead budgets. Also, the response distri-
bution ratios remained approximately the same, from the initial two-
department experiment with zero-base budgeting (Question 13) to the
present Center-wide implementation (Question 14).
Question 16 clearly showed a differential in perceptions about the
quality of management information between the two department sizes
with the larger departments perceiving more improvement than the
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smaller departments. A sample size of six for the large department
response makes this statement tenuous.
Question 19 disclosed that the respondents from smaller depart-
ments recommended discontinuing the zero-base budgeting system
significantly more frequently than did those from the larger departments.
It appears that the technical departments were less interested in zero-
base budgeting than were the support departments.
D. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED RESPONSES BASED ON PARTICIPATION
OR NON-PARTICIPATION IN ORIGINAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
ZERO-BASE BUDGETING (TABLE III)
Question 6 indicates that, while virtually all respondents experienced
an increase in the time and effort for budget preparation during the first
year, 100 percent of the respondents who did not participate in the original
implementation of zero-base budgeting felt it required a "considerable
increase" in time and effort. In Question 11, three fourths of this same
group indicated it did not receive adequate instruction during the first
year of zero-base budgeting. This group may not have received training
and consequently found it necessary to spend more time and effort in
budget preparation or it may have been experiencing the tension of a new
job assignment and therefore projected feelings of anxiety and inadequacy.
Regardless, Question 14 shows this very same group felt it had adequate
cost data with which to prepare its budget requests by a significant
margin, 81. 8 percent, compared to 41.7 percent for the respondents
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who participated in the original implementation of zero-base budgeting.
It may be that the non-participating group is unable to distinguish the
adequacy of cost data or the cost data may, in fact have been adequate.
Question 19 reveals that 54. 6 percent of the non-participating group
felt it was in the best interest of the Center to continue zero-base
budgeting, either as it presently operates, or with major modifications,
yet only 20. percent of those who participated in the original implementa.
tion felt that strongly toward the new system. Both groups had a nearly
equal percentage of respondents who recommended discontinuing the
zero-base budgeting system.
E. COMMENTS ON RESPONSES TO UNSTRUCTURED QUESTIONS
(TABLE IV)
The list of summarized comments for Question 4 satisfies the
expectations developed prior to the survey. The general dissatisfaction
of the respondents with the zero-base process at the time of the survey,
by virtue of the steepness of the first-year learning curve and the in-
ability to see benefits immediately following the expenditure of a great
deal of time and effort, is typified by Comments 5, 6, 8, 9, 23, 31, 34,
and 36 in the response summary to Question 4. The expectation that
some of the dissatisfaction would be attributed to inadequate implementa-
tion planning and guidance by top management and the budget staff is
supported by Comments 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 16, 18, and 29. The
expected problem of paperwork volume was noted six times, as indicated
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in Comment Number 1, making it the single most noted problem. The
expectation that some managers and budget staff would believe zero-
base budgeting was merely an exercise in paperwork designed to satisfy
top management is supported by Comments 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, and
29.
The expectation that some managers would report increased aware-
ness of and control over the functions for which they were responsible
is supported by Comments 1 through 9 of the response summary for
Question 5.
F. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS (TABLES V and VI)
The information in Table V was used to support the analysis in
Section B, above. The information in Table VI is a summary of what
the author considered to be the most thoughtful comments made by
respondents on the General Comments sheet attached to the question-





This section presents the conclusions reached as a result of the
analysis performed on the data obtained during the survey. First,
conclusions about the theoretical problems of implementation which were
adduced in this study to support its main thesis are presented. Second,
the conclusions about the overall implementation of zero-base budgeting
at Naval Weapons Center, China Lake will be presented. Third, the
conclusions reached about the expectations which the study suggested
as a result of the theoretical literature survey and the information
obtained during the intial period of the investigation will be presented.
Finally, some general conclusions will be presented.
While the author believes that, based on the survey and on observa-
tions during seminars, the conclusions are correct and represent a
valid characterization of status of zero-base budgeting at Naval Weapons
Center, China Lake, the reader is cautioned that the sample was limited
to 25 written responses to the survey and that all formal documentation
is based upon this limited sample.
It should again be noted that the implementation of zero-base budget-
ing at Naval Weapons Center, China Lake began at a time when relatively
little information about the subject was generally available. In this
116

regard, the decision to install zero-base budgeting and the efforts made
by everyone at the Center to support it must be considered innovative
and forward-looking actions under conditions of great uncertainty. The
reader is asked to bear in mind this fact when reading the following
conclusions.
B. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THEORETICAL PROBLEMS
1. Information
This study did not investigate all of the problem areas described
by theoretical literature as outlined in Section V. Significant portions
of the Decision Package Formulation and the Ranking Process problem
categories were not addressed.
2. Conclusions
Of the theoretical problem areas considered in the conduct of
this study, Naval Weapons Center, China Lake did not experience any
problems which had not been described somewhere in the theoretical
literature.
The problems experienced by the Center were adequately
described in the theoretical literature.
The theoretical problem categories which predominated this
study were Administrative, Planning Assumption, Top Management,
Time, and Behavioral.
The Administrative problems most prevalent were: (1) paper-
work volume; (2) process design structure (i.e. , problems with
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workplan, timetable, training, communication); and (3) process design
function (i.e., doubts, conflicts, and motivation problems due to unclear
goals and objectives).
The Planning Assumption problems noted most often were:
(1) a wasting of time and resources due to revisions in planning assump-
tions and (2) inadequate coordination/cooperation due to the lack of a
formal method of communicating and revising planning assumptions.
The Top Management problems most apparent were: (1) insuf-
ficient involvement in the implementation process which gave rise to
doubts and fears in lower level management and staff (that positive
involvement by a significant portion of top management perceptible to
the rank and file was not apparent) and (2) unrealistic expectations
(initial emphasis on the cost-cutting feature of zero-base budgeting
and moving too fast in implementation, i. e. , implementation during the
Mid-Year Review).
The Time problems having the greatest impact were: (1) the
large increase in the number of managers, particularly first-line super-
visors, involved in the budget formulation process and (2) the steep
learning curve (i.e., the Center training program designed to acquaint
management and staff with the basics of zero-base budgeting) peculiar
to the first year of implementation.
The Behavioral problems noted most often were: (1) the beliefs
that, (a) zero-base budgeting was not a very different budgeting system
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from the previous one (i.e., the base-line/increment-line concept),
and (b) zero-base budgeting would not provide enough benefits to make it
worth its costs; and (2) gamesmanship tactics (i.e., including low
priority functions in the minimum level of effort decision package).
3. Opinion
It is the opinion of the author that more attention to and under-
standing of the theoretical problems of implementation, particularly on
the part of top management, would have prevented or greatly reduced
a number of actual problems experienced by the Center in implementing
zero-base budgeting.
C. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION OF ZERO-BASE
BUDGETING AT NAVAL WEAPONS CENTER, CHINA LAKE
1. Information
The conclusions which follow resulted from analysis of the
information contained in the survey questionnaire.
2. Conclusions
The earliest efforts by top management to implement zero-
base budgeting, the cost-reduction campaigns conducted during 1976
on the magnetic card typewriters and the computers throughout the
installation, unintentionally predisposed a significant portion of the
management and staff population against zero-base budgeting.
This predisposition, caused by the cost-reduction campaign




It appeared that for the full-scale implementation of zero-base
budgeting management generally used correct theoretical procedures.
During the full-scale implementation of zero-base budgeting,
attempts to compensate for the aforementioned predisposition required
additional time and effort, particularly by upper-level managers, i.e.
,
budget call by committee.
At the time of this study, Naval Weapons Center was experienc-
ing the expected, normal first-year problems attendant to the implementa-
tion of a zero-base budgeting system. As an organization undergoing a
major change, the Center was "at the top of the cost curve" and "at the
bottom of the benefit curve" as it completed its first year of work with
zero-base budgeting. The "learning curve" was steepest during that
period of time. A great deal of work had been done but few benefits
had been recognized.
There was both widespread dissatisfaction with, and a strong
base of support for, zero-base budgeting in the organization at the time
of the survey.
It could not be determined what portion of the dissatisfaction
was caused directly by problems with implementation procedures.
A significant majority of budget staff and managers appeared
to believe that the Office of Finance and Management did not conduct




There was some uncertainty among budget staff and managers
about the value of zero-base budgeting as an improvement over the
previous budget system.
There was substantial doubt among managers and budget
staff whether the benefits of zero-base budgeting would be worth the
effort.
The training efforts conducted or initiated by the Center had a
positive effect on the knowledge level of managers and budget staff as
applied to decision package formulation.
There was a significant increase in management involvement
in the budget formulation process, particularly among first-line
supervisors.
The increased involvement of managers in the budget formula-
tion process led to greater awareness of, and control over, their
functional areas of responsibility.
Where it was perceived, the absence of first-line supervisory
involvement had a negative effect on the view of budget staff and managers
toward continuing the zero-base system at Naval Weapons Center.
Some shifting of resources occurred within departments as a
result of zero-base budgeting.
There was no correlation between the acceptance or rejection
of zero-base budgeting and reallocation of resources.
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Zero-base budgeting, as practiced at the Center at the time of
this study, took more time and effort than the previous budgeting system.
Cost data for use in decision package formulation were, in
some cases, difficult to obtain.
D. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT EXPECTATIONS
1. Information
The five expectations, described in the Conduct of Research
section, which were developed as a result of the literature survey and
information gathered during the training seminars on zero-base budgeting,
were generally substantiated by the data obtained from the survey
questionnaire.
2. Conclusions
The expected dissatisfaction among staff and management with
the implementation effort was generally substantiated by the comments,
made in response to Question 4 of the survey, which are displayed in
Table IV. The distribution of responses to Questions 3 and 19, displayed
in Table I, likewise support this expectation.
The expectation that dissatisfaction with implementation plan-
ning and guidance on the part of top management and the budget staff
would be expressed was generally supported by Comments 7 and 8 in
Table VI and specifically by the response distributions of Questions 10,
11, and 12 as shown in Table I.
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The expectation that volume of paperwork would be considered
a major problem was generally supported by Comment 1 for Question 4
in Table IV and by Comment 9 in Table VI.
The expectation that some managers and budget staff would
believe that zero-base budgeting was merely an exercise in paperwork
designed to satisfy top management's desires to improve budgeting
methods was generally substantiated by Comment 10 in Table VI and
Comments 11, 20, and 29 to Question 4 in Table IV.
The expectation that some managers would report increased
awareness of and control over their functional areas of responsibility
due to their involvement in the budget process was upheld generally by
Comment 3 in Table VI and the response distributions for survey ques-
tions 8 and 9, displayed in Table I.
E. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of this study, it could not be empirically concluded
that correct implementation of zero-base budgeting, with respect to the
theoretical writings , leads to expected satisfactory results.
It was concluded that incorrect implementation procedures will
lead to expected problems.
Naval Weapons Center, China Lake has expended a large
amount of time, effort, and other resources to implement a zero-base
budgeting system. The problems attendant to that implementation were
neither unusual to the body of knowledge about zero-base budgeting nor





This section first presents summary comments followed by three
recommendations for Naval Weapons Center, China Lake regarding
zero-base budgeting. It then presents two recommendations for avoiding
many of the problems attendant to the implementation' of a zero-base
budgeting system.
B. SUMMARY COMMENTS
In his book, Zero-Base Budgeting Comes of Age , Logan Cheek
discusses the essential value of the zero-base budgeting technique. He
first points out that experience suggests that many planning and budget-
ing executives have difficulty using the system and achieving the bottom-
line benefits claimed for it. He points out two reasons why this is true:
Usually, what's lacking is either an in-depth appreciation
of zero-base budgeting techniques, or more commonly,
the art of handling the behavioral subtleties of the or-
ganization. If management fails on either of those
counts, zero-base budgeting may generate more heat
than light. 15
Cheek also notes that existing management literature does not
adequately cover the two crucial aspects of zero-base budgeting - what




objective of zero-base budgeting is to compare alternate uses of scarce
resources and that, if zero-base budgeting is to be of practical use, it
must be considered in view of the broad, long-range needs of the or-
ganization as expressed in its goals, strategies, and objectives.
Understanding all of the ramifications of zero-base budgeting can
be a discouraging endeavor because effective use of the system requires
the incorporation of time-tested principles from many management
disciplines. Among these principles are problem solving, systems
analysis, cost/benefit analysis, management by objectives, and careful
attention to the age-old skills of persuasion. Cheek states clearly the
basic dilemma faced by the executive implementing zero-base budgeting:
These demanding aspects of zero-base budgeting inject
a sobering element into our high aspirations for it.
Considering the broad skills required to implement the
process successfully, it may well seem amusing that
budget staffs go through elaborate gymnastics to install
zero-base budgeting procedures. On the one hand, if
we fail to pay attention to these management basics, we
risk failure by oversimplification; on the other hand,
with proper attention to the basics we may well create
an unmanageable leviathan. 16
An objective look at the resource allocation decision-making
process suggests that zero-base budgeting has proved its worth as a
technique for decision-making and that this dilemma need not prevent
its successful implementation. Ultimately, all management decisions
are made by people with different personalities, backgrounds, sets of
16 Cheek, p. 167.
125

relationships and with differ eing abilities to innovate, analyze, and
synthesize. Rarely are bold innovations made quickly, but rather they
result from careful and lengthy study and discussion. Often, several
alternatives are pursued simultaneously until economics or some other
imperative forces a decision. And regardless of the objectivity and
thorough analysis contained in a series of decision packages, a final
"yes/no" decision often requires several meetings of committees,
working groups, or task forces, each shrouded in political intrigue,
often riddled with attacks and counterattacks by different interest
groups. It is here, in this arduous, complex, potentially destructive
process leading to a major decision, that zero-base budgeting has
emerged as a valuable aid to informed judgement. There are several
reasons for this.
First, zero-base budgeting is a disciplined technique for organiz-
ing and displaying the possible alternative decisions, analyzing the
costs, benefits, and risks of each, thus revealing their broad impact
on the total organization rather than just one functional part of it.
Second, in addition to sharpening the insights of individual man-
agers, both the format of decision packages and the proper use of
persuasion skills disciplines the collective discussions during ranking
meetings. Initially, each player may well champion a particular set
of packages, using his intellect, training, and personal aims to advocate
the interests he represents. Arguments follow, often ignoring factual
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evidence. But zero-base budgeting in its broadest sense refocuses the
discussion away from irrelevant political disputes by imposing its logical
fact-based framework which helps distinguish fair criticisms from phony
arguments.
Third, that disciplined framework provides a complete and simple
technique for the members of the management team to use in order to
grasp the essence of a problem, identify and evaluate alternative solutions,
and select an appropriate and affordable level of effort.
Pointing out the the true value of zero-base budgeting, Cheek notes:
This is where the essential importance of zero-base
budgeting lies and why rigorous exposition of alter-
native ways and levels of achieving the same objective
is necessary. If only the costs of a given approach
were important, then traditional budgeting techniques
(or more probably, simple cost/benefit analysis) would
suffice to group the packages' economic implications.
The characteristic strength of zero-base budgeting
derives from its subtler aspect: the analytic discipline
it requires from its users, who must assess the assump-
tions of each package, how it ties to the organization's
objectives and strategies, and what its legal, technical,
and operational ramifications are. This characteristic
of zero-base budgeting, substantially missing from other
techniques, makes it the exciting valued new management
tool it is, and has made it come of age.
The preceding comments were intended to give the reader an accurate
glimpse into the heart of the zero-base budgeting philosophy. For those
still confounded by its apparent complexity, it need only be as cumber-
some as its users make it. For those timid before the challenge of
17 Cheek, p. 168.
127

zero-base budgeting, a final thought: It is hard work to make difficult
decisions under uncertain conditions, but that's what good managers are
paid to do.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NAVAL WEAPONS CENTER, CHINA
LAKE REGARDING ZERO-BASE BUDGETING
It is recommended that Naval Weapons Center, China Lake
continue the full-scale implementation of a zero-base budgeting system
in all departments, both Technical and Support.
It is recommended, consistent with the views of the zero-base
budgeting theorists, that a thorough reevaluation of the zero-base budget-
ing implementation program be conducted.
It is recommended that emphasis on the increased participation
of top management in the program of implementation, and eventually
the normal budget formulation process, of zero-base budgeting be
intensified.
D. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AVOIDING MANY PROBLEMS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A ZERO-BASE
BUDGETING SYSTEM
1. Develop a Zero-Base Budgeting Manual Tailored for Use with
the Particular Organization
In order to implement a zero-base budgeting system successfully,
a most important first step should include the preparation and distribution
of a locally designed manual. Both Pyhrr and Cheek stress this point
and provide sample manuals in their work. For detailed study, the reader
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is referred to those sources. Briefly, however, such a manual would
include the following subjects: (1) a letter of introduction; (2) the pur-
pose, philosophy, concepts, and objectives of zero-base budgeting;
(3) the strategic outlook for the organization; (4) instructions for decision
packages; (5) instructions for the ranking process; (6) a calendar of
events; and (7) corporate standard guidelines and planning assumptions.
Each of these subjects will be very briefly discussed below.
The chief executive's full and explicit support is essential if
the zero-base budgeting process is to be implemented successfully.
The manual should therefore start with a letter of introduction from the
chief executive . . . expressing his firm personal commitment to and
1
8
intent to be involved in the zero-base budgeting effort. Including a
statement that budgets will be determined through the zero-base budget-
ing process lends necessary backing and weight to the importance of the
effort.
The purpose, philosophy, concepts, and objectives section
describes briefly zero-base budgeting and sells its benefits. It should
point out that the process shifts the burden of proof to each manager to
justify why he should spend any money. It should explain what zero-
base budgeting will do for each manager and should tell the advantages
of using a zero-base system. It should explain the concept of a decision




unit and should explain the concept of a decision package as a document
which contains analysis of decision units with respect to the two alter-
natives of different ways of performing the same function and different
levels of effort of performing the function. The ranking process should
also be explained and the time reducing technique of focusing on the
packages which are ranked just above and just below the expected funding
line should be discussed. The line of connection between the long-range
planning cycle; the organizational goals, objectives and strategies; the
decision units which analyze the discrete functions, operations, or
activities which support those goals, objectives, and strategies; and
the decision packages which contain the analysis of the decision units
should be drawn clearly and described succinctly. It should be explained
that zero-base budgeting is a decision-making technique and one of its
end products happens to be a budget. Its primary purpose is to help
determine what is going to be accomplished, how its going to be done
(or done better), and why its being done. The issue of how much it will
cost will be resolved in a simple, mechanical, unemotional way.
The purpose of the strategic outlook section is to relate the
proposed zero-budgeting system to the organization's long-range plans.
Information about such plans is normally classified and should be dis-
cussed only on a "need to know" basis. The natural order of presenta-
tion for the body of this section would be to start with a broad assessment
of the organization's environment, translate this evaluation into long-
range objectives to be pursued by the organization, and finally discuss
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the specific strategies for achieving them.
The section containing instructions for and examples of decision
packages explains the four steps in the decision package formulation
process: (1) Define objectives for each function within a given manager's
area of responsibility; (2) Describe alternative ways of obtaining each
objective; (3) Choose the best alternative by considering (a) legal require-
ments, (b) immediate payback, (c) technical feasibility, (d) operational
feasibility, (e) economic feasibility, and (f) the risks of not acting; and
(4) Describe the different levels of effort (with the constraint that the
sum of, at least, the first two increments proposed should equal this
year's spending level).
Management may decide to issue separately instructions for the
ranking process only to those who will do the ranking. Having this sec-
tion included in the manual, however, allows everyone to understand
quite specifically how the entire process will work and diffuses any
uncomfortable feelings of being threatened among the rank-and-file
managers. The variety of ranking procedures available is such that a
discussion of them is considered infeasible in this study; however,
three questions should be answered by whatever process is employed:
Which of the proposed decision packages best support the
organization's goals, as established in the long-range planning cycle?
How much will be spent in pursuing these goals?
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For the packages not approved, what are the consequences of
not implementing them? How can those problems be anticipated and
how can they be managed?
To ensure timely completion of the budgeting process, the
manual should incorporate a detailed schedule of events for the zero-
base budgeting effort. This timetable should be developed using realistic
estimates of the time required to perform specific tasks and it should
include sufficiently detailed instructions for managers and staff to under-
stand what is expected of them.
In a zero-base budgeting system, where many, many rank-and-
file managers will be involved, most for the first time, in the planning
process, a common set of ground rules for standard cost factors, plan-
ning assumptions, and expenditure guidelines is particularly critical.
Unless all use the same values for such things as revenue growth,
labor rates, or productivity improvements, the ranking and decision-
making process will become hopelessly confused. The factors and
assumptions will, obviously, be unique for any organization undertaking
zero-base budgeting and will have to be updated for every new budgeting
cycle. They should be detailed enough to permit developing intelligent,
reasonably accurate decision packages, but not so overly complicated
as to invite the "paralysis through analysis" syndrome. A statement
instructing managers to use the assumptions when putting together zero-
base budgeting decision packages should accompany the data.
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2. Use These Guidelines to Avoid Implementation Problems
Cheek provides several general guidelines to eschew many of
19
the problems common to the implementation process. It is highly
recommended that these guidelines be considered carefully and followed
closely, not only in preparing the locally designed implementation
manual, but also subsequently as actual implementation is in progress.
Briefly, Cheek's guidelines require:
Obtain the endorsement, cooperation, and participation of senior
management.
Set your goals - both for your organization and the zero-base
budgeting process - and get to them.
Before starting, review your organization.
Obtain adequate staff to start up the zero-base budgeting process,
Set up contacts throughout the organization.
Establish clear review procedures for the decision packages.
Get off to a good start.
Reevaluate the program after a trial period.
Beware of self-appointed experts.
Expect to spend a lot of time.
Beware of shortcuts. Zero-base budgeting is not easy. You
get what you pay for.




Follow up with feedback to all participants on what happened to
their decision packages or ideas.
Do not expect immediate Return on Investment.
Do not expect miracles.
If you're the controller of manager in charge of the zero-base
budgeting process in your organization, keep your cool. As Robert
Townsend says, the controller "must never lose his head - that's what
managements do, not controllers . . . There abideth accuracy, timeliness,
understanding, and unflappability in the controller's office - and the
,20
greatest of these is all four of them.
Everyone involved in the process, whether they're developing
decision packages, reviewing them, or ranking them, and even those
developing the basic procedures and forms, should challenge anything
connected with the zero-base budgeting process with these three questions:
"So what? " "What else? " and "Why? "
Remember that zero-base budgeting is a means to an end, not
an end in itself. It is very easy to become trapped in analyzing all the
information that zero-base budgeting will invariably produce. While
much of the analysis will be provocative and will indeed in many cases
lead to innovative ideas for improving operations, the information con-
tained in the decision packages is above all a means to make decisions
on better resource allocation.
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From: Head, Budget Division (Code 083)
To: Distribution
Subj : Evaluation Study of the NWC Zero-Base Budget System
Encl: (1) General Instructions for ZBB Questionnaire
(2) Questionnaire: Zero-Base Budgeting
1. A study is being conducted to evaluate the zero-base budget system at
NWC, China Lake and your help is needed. The opinions cf budget analysts
and fiscal officers such as yourself are critical co the study and would
be appreciated. It is understood that not all the questions will be
appropriate to all cases. You are requested to provide responses to the
best of your ability.
?.<• Enclosure (1) is a genera] instruction sheet to assist you in filling
out the questionnaire. Enclosure (2) is a questionnaire seeking your
opinions on various aspects of the zero-base budget system. The information
contained in the completed questionnaire will be held in strictest, confidence
Only summary information will appear in the published results of the study.
Please do not identify yourself or your department in the questionnaire.
3. A return envelope is provided for your convenience. Thank you for




































General Instructions for ZBB Questionnaire
There are five general questions on the first two pages of the
questionnaire. Please answer them before completing the remaining
questions and please do not change your answers to questions 1 thru 5
after answering questions 6 thru 19.
The first question asks you to categorize your department based
on the total amount of overhead funds received in 1977 (FY). This is
needed to identify the problems peculiar to the various levels of organiza-
tion during the zero-base budgeting process. The second general ques-
tion is concerned with whether you were the budget analyst/fiscal officer
of your present department when zero-base budgeting was first im-
plemented. If your answer to this is "no, " please complete the question-
naire as you feel it would have been done in your present department.
The third question asks for your basic general impression of the zero-
base budgeting system now being used at NWC. The fourth and fifth
questions seek to identify the major problems and benefits resulting
from the implementation of zero-base budgeting at NWC. The study is
primarily interested in identifying those problems you have actually
experienced and those benefits you can readily identify. If you know
about other major problems or have heard about other benefits, list
them also. Naturally, the more information you can provide, the better,
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but considering your time constraints, a brief description of the problems
and benefits you do list would be appreciated. Also note that space has
been provided below selected questions and at the end of the question-





1. Size of department based on FY-77 allocation of funds for indirect
expenses (for Support departments, use approved G&A dollar cost level;










3. In your opinion, is ZBB an improvement over the previous budget






4. List the major problems you have experienced or know about
resulting from the implementation of ZBB at NWC, China Lake.
Briefly describe each. (Use back if necessary)
5. List the major benefits you have experienced or know about
resulting from the implementation of ZBB at NWC, China Lake,
Briefly describe each. (Use back if necessary)
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6. What effect did the zero-base budget system have on the time and
effort in budget preparation during the first year of its implementation?
Increased considerably.
Increased slightly
Remained about the same.
Decreased slightly.
Decreased considerably.
7. Now that the ZBB system has been implemented, how great is the







8. Did the department head become more involved in budget formulation






9. Did the first-line supervisors become more involved in budget
formulation after the implementation of ZBB?
Much more involved.
Slightly more involved.
About the same as before.
Much less involved.
10. Do you feel adequate advance planning on the part of Department 08







11. Do you feel you received adequate instructions during the first




12. Do you feel you presently have adequate instructions as to how to




13. During the first year of operating with the zero-base budget





14. Do you feel you presently have adequate cost data necessary to





15. Did implementation of the ZBB system cause a shifting of financial
resources among functions in your department?
Large shifting of financial resources.
Some shifting of financial resources.





16. All good management systems generate information for management
planning and control. What effect did the zero-base budgeting system
have on the quality of management information as compared to the
previous budgeting system?
Quality of management information substantially improved.
Quality of management information slightly improved.
About the same as before.
Quality of management information slightly decreased.
Quality of management information substantially decreased.
Comment:
17. After your department has submitted its decision package rankings
for executive review, are you notified of any changes in these rankings
and the reasons for the change?
Always.
Most of the time.
Seldom.
Never.
18. Presently, you are required to prepare decision packages represent-
ing different levels of effort for each function. Do you feel it is practical




19. This study is very interested in your opinion of the zero-base
budgeting system. Which of the following choices do you feel is in the
best interest of NWC, China Lake?
Continue the ZBB system substantially as it operates today.
Continue the ZBB system with some major modifications.
Continue the ZBB system except that it not be employed every
year.
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